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ABSTRACT: 
The question posed by this paper is whether the development of mineral resource 
policies in Western Australia is aligned with the goals of inclusive growth and 
sustainable development expressed in the Africa Mining Vision which was 
drafted in 2009. In exploring Africa’s transition from an object of investment to 
an agent of investment, the history of mining in Africa and the dominant 
narratives that have often explained and constrained Africa’s development have 
been explored. Africa’s early resource development experience was shaped by 
colonial intervention and by the impact of World Bank Group interventions. An 
analysis of some of these reforms has been made. Overall, while World Bank 
Group interventions did increase investment into Africa’s extractive industries, 
there were also significant negative impacts to African governments and African 
people. African countries now seek to be the stewards of their own development. 
One avenue for African development is through the promotion of their mineral 
industries. Western Australia has recently signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with COMESA Member States to assist these states in promoting 
their mineral industries. The development ideology of Western Australia’s 
mineral industry is explored and compared to statements contained in the Africa 
Mining Vision. It is argued that the experience and ideology of resources 
development in Western Australia is not aligned with the goals of expressed in the 
Africa Mining Vision.  
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AFRICAN MINING REGIME REFORM: IS THE WESTERN AUSTRALIAN 
EXPERIENCE OF RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT ALIGNED WITH THE AFRICA 
MINING VISION? 
MICHELLE GAYNOR 
I  INTRODUCTION 
Global interest in the development of African countries is not a new phenomenon. 
In 2002, a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (‘UNCTAD’) 
publication stated that: 
Africa has seen the most intense and recurrent application of structural 
adjustment programmes over the past two decades without making much 
progress in either poverty alleviation or development.
1
 
The UNCTAD publication further noted that the application of these adjustment 
programmes had often had the effect of wresting control of development 
strategies away from African governments.
2
 This paper explores how African 
governments, through African development bodies, are seeking to regain their 
ownership and participation in developing appropriate legislative regimes for 
Africa’s mining industries. As part of developing appropriate legislative regimes, 
African countries have been assessing the experiences and progress of other 
resource rich nations, such as Australia. In this context, Mr Barnett, the current 
Premier of Western Australia, in recent years has been actively working to foster 
relationships with African governments. As Western Australian (‘WA’) is often 
heralded as having a successful resource based economy, Mr Barnett has offered 
the State’s assistance to African governments seeking to reform mining 
legislation to promote their minerals industries.  
                                                          
1
  ‘Economic Development in Africa: From Adjustment to Poverty Reduction: What is new?’ 
(UNCTAD/GDS/AFRICA/2, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2002) 5. 
2
  Ibid 6. 
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Recently, The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (‘COMESA’) 
States
3
 accepted Mr Barnett’s offer of assistance. In January 2014, WA and the 
COMESA States signed a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MOU’).4 One of the 
purposes of the MOU is the promotion of strategies for investment in minerals 
and petroleum and the development of linkages in the COMESA States’ mineral 
industries.
5
 However, an examination of WA’s resource development ideologies, 
as they inform the content of the State’s mining laws, will show that the State’s 
ideologies are not aligned with the goals of inclusive growth and sustainable 
development expressed in the Africa Mining Vision (‘AMV’).6   
A  Structure 
In exploring whether WA’s development ideologies are aligned with Africa’s 
goals for the development of its mineral industries, this paper will be in three 
substantive parts. 
The first part of the paper will explore Australia’s interest in Africa’s 
development. By way of background, some of the events leading to Mr Barnett’s 
keynote address at the 2014 ‘Investing in African Mining Indaba’ (‘Mining 
Indaba’) will be discussed. Further, prior to Mr Barnett’s address, he signed a 
MOU for WA with the COMESA States. Some of the goals of the MOU will be 
highlighted in this part of the paper. In addition, some of the steps taken since the 
MOU was signed will illustrate the further strengthening of the relationship 
between WA and the COMESA States. 
                                                          
3
  The COMESA member states include the Republic of Burundi, Union of the Comoros, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Djibouti, Arab Republic of Egypt, the State of 
Eritrea, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Republic of Kenya, Libya, Republic of 
Madagascar, Republic of Malawi, Republic of Mauritius, Republic of Rwanda, Republic of 
Seychelles, Republic of The Sudan, the Kingdom of Swaziland, the Republic of Uganda, 
Republic of Zambia and the Republic of Zimbabwe. 
4
 Memorandum of Understanding between The Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA) and The Government of Western Australia on Cooperation in the Field of 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources, Agriculture, Vocational Training and Capacity Building 
(signed at Lusaka, Zambia on 31 January 2014) (‘COMESA MOU’). [7.1] 
5
  COMESA MOU, clause 3. 
6
  African Union, ‘Africa Mining Vision’ (African Union, February 2009). 
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The second part of this paper will consider two of the dominant narratives for 
resource development in Africa, the resource curse and the Dutch disease. An 
explanation of the resource curse theory and Dutch disease will precede an 
examination of the history of mining in Africa. In considering the historical 
context of mining in Africa it is instructive to understand the impact of colonial 
mining on Africa’s mining industries. As African countries became independent, 
many of them suffered from indebtedness and poverty. During the 1980s, in 
response to this issue, the World Bank Group (‘WBG’) became particularly active 
in devising policies to assist African countries to improve their economic 
conditions. Three generations of WBG mining reform in Africa will be 
examined.
7
 This examination will illustrate that the WBG limited itself to poverty 
reduction measures that relied upon increasing foreign investment into African 
countries and minimising the role of the state. Consequently, it is apparent that the 
WBG sought to rely on the operation of the free markets to manage broader 
development issues in developing countries. In 2003 the Extractive Industries 
Review (‘EIR’) released its report on the effects of the WBG’s intervention into 
the extractive industries in developing countries. Some of the testimony given to 
the EIR by African civil society will be considered and some of the findings of 
the EIR will be discussed. While the WBG interventions were successful in 
increasing investment into African countries’ extractive industries, it is clear from 
the civil society testimony and EIR findings that there were also significant 
negative impacts to African societies from these interventions. 
The third part of this paper will consider the central policy document for mining 
in Africa, the Africa Mining Vision.  The AMV was drafted by a taskforce made 
up of representatives from the African Union (‘AU’), the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (‘UNECA’), the African Mining Partnership 
(‘AMP’), the African Development Bank (‘AfDB’), UNCTAD and the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO). The AMV was adopted 
by the African Union Heads of State in February 2009.
8
 A central goal of the 
AMV is to build a single African market. This has also been expressed as 
                                                          
7
  Bonnie Campbell (ed), ‘Regulating Mining in Africa: For Whose Benefit?’ (Discussion Paper 
26, Groupe de recherche sur les activités minières en Afrique (GRAMA), 2004).  
8
  Africa Mining Vision, Africa Mining Vision <http://www.africaminingvision.org/about.html>. 
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‘breaking with the enclave model of natural resource extraction.’9 In 2011, 
following the drafting of the AMV, the ‘Action Plan for Implementing the AMV’ 
was adopted. In September 2014, the Africa Minerals Development Centre 
(‘AMDC’) published ‘A Country Mining Vision Guidebook: Domesticating the 
Africa Mining Vision’ (‘CMV Guidebook’).10 The AMDC was created as joint 
initiative of the African Union Commission, the AFDB, and UNECA.
11
 The 
CMV Guidebook was produced following the workshop ‘Methodology for the 
Country Mining Vision (CMV)’ held in Ethiopia from 15 to 20 September 2014. 
The purpose of the CMV Guidebook is to: 
assist member States to domesticate the Africa Mining Vision (AMV) at the 
national level through a multi-stakeholder consultative process that will lead 
to broad-based development and structural transformation.
12
  
Analysis of these documents will show the emergence and strengthening of an 
African-driven policy for the development of mining industries in Africa. 
Following from this analysis, and in light of the recently signed MOU, WA’s 
development ideologies will be considered. As stated earlier, this analysis will 
establish that the State’s ideologies are not aligned with Africa’s goals for its 
mining industries to catalyse inclusive and sustainable development. 
II  INTEREST IN AFRICA’S MINERAL ENDOWMENT 
Global interest in Africa has intensified in the new century. Undoubtedly this 
interest has been fuelled by Africa’s impressive growth; African economies are 
growing at twice the rate of growth seen in the 1990s.
13
 One contributor to 
                                                          
9
  Africa Progress Panel, ‘Africa Progress Report 2013: Equity in Extractives - Stewarding 
Africa’s Natural Resources for All’ (2013) 10.  
10
  ‘A Country Mining Vision Guidebook: Domesticating the Africa Mining Vision’ (African 
Minerals Development Centre, September 2014). 
11
  ‘The African Minerals Development Centre: Business Plan’ (African Union Commission, 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and African Development Bank, August 
2012) 7. 
12
  ‘A Country Mining Vision Guidebook: Domesticating the Africa Mining Vision’ (African 
Minerals Development Centre, September 2014). 
13
  ‘Supporting the Transformation of the Private Sector in Africa Private Sector Development 
Strategy, 2013-2017’ (African Development Bank Group, 2013) 2. 
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Africa’s growth has been increased foreign investment generally and, particularly, 
investment into extractive industries. Notwithstanding the fact that geological 
mapping of Africa has not yet uncovered the entirety of its mineral potential, in 
2005 UNECA estimated that Africa had the world’s largest reserves of platinum 
group metals, phosphate, gold, chromium, manganese, vanadium, cobalt, 
diamonds and aluminium.
14
 According to the 2014 World Investment Report, in 
2013 foreign direct investment into Africa increased by 4 per cent to a total of $57 
billion.
15
 Assessments also indicate that for the period 2000 to 2008 natural 
resources attributed 24% to Africa’s GDP.16  
Notwithstanding this impressive growth, many African countries are still 
classified as fragile states and many African people suffer extreme poverty. The 
WBG defines extreme poverty as ‘average daily consumption of $1.25 or less and 
means living on the edge of subsistence.’17 The AfDB highlights the importance 
of inclusive growth policies to combat poverty in African countries. In September 
2013, the AfDB released a working paper that contained a prediction that if 
African economic growth continued to follow current trends, 39% of the African 
population will be living in extreme poverty by 2015.
18
 One avenue by which 
African countries are seeking to improve the conditions of African people is by 
the exploitation of their significant mineral resource endowment. 
In recent years, Australia and WA have become acutely interested in 
developments in Africa’s extractive industries. The Australian Government’s 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (‘DFAT’) states that Australia has a 
national interest in the security, stability and prosperity of sub-Saharan Africa. 
DFAT recognises that mining ‘offers African countries an unparalleled 
opportunity to stimulate growth and reduce poverty’ if the industry can be well 
                                                          
14
  ‘Africa Review Report on Mining (Executive Summary)’ (Executive Summary, United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa) 2. 
15
  ‘World Investment Report 2014 – Investing in SDGs: An Action Plan’ (UNCTAD/WIR/2014, 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 24 June 2014) 37. 
16
  ‘Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of African Economies’ (McKinsey Global 
Institute, June 2010) 2. 
17
  Extreme Poverty Rates Continue to Fall (6 February 2010) The World Bank 
<http://data.worldbank.org/news/extreme-poverty-rates-continue-to-fall>. 
18
  John C Anywanu, ‘Determining the Correlates of Poverty for Inclusive Growth in Africa’ 
(Working Paper Series, No 181, African Development Group Bank, September 2013) 3. 
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managed.
19
 Also, by assisting and promoting Africa’s growth, Australian efforts 
foster gateways for Australian trade and investment, with a particular focus on 
mining.
 20
 For WA, the importance of Africa’s extractive industries is that: 
The involvement of WA mining companies in Africa is part of the future of 
Australian mining. The extent to which we can broaden out can only be 
good for the industry.
21
 
In recent years, Mr Barnett has acted to strengthen the ties between African 
countries and WA at a governmental level. In 2011, WA hosted the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government (‘CHOGM’) meetings. Colin Barnett in 
‘Prospect’ (Western Australia’s International Resources Development Magazine) 
stated that CHOGM provided WA with opportunities ‘to enhance and create 
investment and trade relationships’, noting that ‘Perth is a growing regional centre 
for the resources services industry … connected to global supply chains.’22 In 
light of the mining expertise resident in Perth, Mr Barnett used CHOGM to 
promote the state’s capabilities to African delegates and offered to share the 
lessons learned by the State in managing its resources industries.
23
 Perth also 
hosts the annual Africa Down Under Conference (‘ADU’). In a February 2013 
media release, DFAT stated that the ADU ‘is one of the foremost international 
mining events focused on Africa.’24 Further, in March 2013, the Western 
Australian Liberal Party released ‘The Liberals’ Mines and Petroleum Policy.’25 
While the policy highlighted the importance of the energy and resources 
industries to the Western Australian economy, and noted the sector’s reliance on 
                                                          
19
  Sub-Saharan Africa (25 September 2014) Australian Government, Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade <http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/sub-saharan-africa/Pages/default.aspx>.  
20
  Ibid.  
21
  Dominic Piper, ‘Barnett Bolsters WA-Africa Connections’ Australia’s Paydirt, March 2014, 
29. 
22
  Department of Mines and Petroleum and Department of State Development, Prospect 
(Western Australia) September – November 2011. 
23
  Department of Mines and Petroleum and Department of State Development ‘WA Working 
with Africa’, Prospect (Western Australia) September – November 2011, 11.   
24
  Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Africa Down Under 
Mining Conference’ (Media Release, 25 February 2013) 
<http://aid.dfat.gov.au/MediaReleases/Pages/Africa-Down-Under-Mining-Conference.aspx>. 
25
  Liberal Party of Australia, Western Australian Division, ‘The Liberals’ Mines and Petroleum 
Policy’ (6 March 2013) 
<http://www.wa.liberal.org.au/sites/www.wa.liberal.org.au/files/plans/Mines.pdf>. 
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attracting overseas investment, the policy also contained provisions to promote 
WA’s mining services sector into international markets, in particular in to 
Africa.
26
 In June 2013, the Government of Western Australia’s European Office 
hosted the concluding reception for the ‘Mining on Top Africa’ annual conference 
held in London.
27
 As many mining project financiers are based in London, this 
event represented an opportunity for WA to promote its capabilities in respect to 
African mining projects. These steps, amongst others, have contributed to the 
foundations for relationships between WA and many African governments. 
A  Western Australia and Africa – Working Together?  
The Mining Indaba is ‘an annual professional conference dedicated to the 
capitalisation and development of mining interests in Africa.’28 It is one of the 
world’s preeminent mining conferences and is held each year in Cape Town, 
South Africa. While it is unusual for a non-national level leader to speak at the 
Mining Indaba, in light of his recent work to build relationships with African 
governments and his experience in the mining industries in WA, Mr Barnett was a 
keynote speaker at the 2014 event. Not only is Mr Barnett the Premier of Western 
Australia, he is also the Minister for State Development and Science. Prior to 
becoming the Premier, he was also appointed the State’s Minister for Mines and 
Petroleum. His parliamentary biography states that he is ‘committed to attracting 
investment and assisting the development of major projects based around Western 
Australia's natural advantages in mining, petroleum and agriculture.’29  
As noted by Mr Barnett during his keynote address at the Mining Indaba, 236 
Australian companies operate in Africa and over 70% of these companies are 
                                                          
26
  Ibid 6.   
27
  WAGO Hosts African Mining Delegates (3 July 2013) Government of Western Australia, 
European Office <http://www.wago.co.uk/index.php/news/trade/wa-hosts-african-mining-
delegates-in-london.html>. 
28
  About Mining Indaba (2014) Investing in African Mining Indaba 
<http://www.miningindaba.com/ehome/indaba/about/?&>. 
29
  Government of Western Australia, Biography – Hon Colin Barnett MEc MLA, Premier, 
Minister for State Development; Science (13 February 2014) Premier of Western Australia & 
Cabinet Ministers <http://www.premier.wa.gov.au/Ministers/Colin-
Barnett/Pages/Biography.aspx>. 
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Western Australian.
30
 He also pointed to the ‘strong parallels between African 
and Australian mining’31 noting both countries shared an ‘ancient history of 
mining dating back through thousands of years.’32 He also offered his insight in to 
the challenges facing governments seeking to develop and promote their mining 
industry. The difficulties that he pointed to include the remote location of mineral 
resources, sovereign risk,
 33
 the creation of an appropriate legislative regime for 
the minerals industry,
34
 negotiating a fair price,
35
 and determining ownership.
36
 In 
addition, he also spoke of the difficulties he had experienced in managing the 
demands of the mining companies which, in his view, often fail to realise that, in 
addition to seeking community benefits, governments also have a direct 
commercial interest in projects.
37
 On a point of difference between the mineral 
resource industries in WA and Africa, Mr Barnett noted the favourable perception 
that Australia enjoys as the ‘lucky country’ and he also observed that mining in 
WA has benefitted from a ‘fortunate mix of discovery and global events.’38  
In concluding his address, Mr Barnett repeated the offer of assistance from WA to 
African governments as they seek to develop their mining industries.
39
 In making 
the offer of assistance, he pointed to the changing fortunes of the mining 
industries in WA and Africa. While mining in Africa is growing and many 
countries are on the brink of developing their own significant mining industries, 
the projections for the WA’s mining industry indicates that it has reached 
maturity.
40
 For example, the Western Australian Minerals Research Institute 
Research Plan notes that Australia’s share of global minerals expenditure fell 
from 20% in 1996 to 13% in 2009.
41
  It is also projected that exploration activity 
                                                          
30
  Colin Barnett, ‘Australian Mining in Africa’ (Speech delivered at the Investing in African 
Mining Indaba, Cape Town, South Africa, 5 February 2014) 8. 
31
  Ibid. 3.  
32
  Ibid.   
33
  Ibid 9.   
34
  Ibid 10-11.   
35
  Ibid 11-12.  
36
  Ibid 11-12.   
37
  Ibid 9.   
38
  Ibid 4.   
39
  Ibid 13.   
40
  Ibid 5.   
41
  Australian Venture Consultants Pty Ltd, ‘Western Australian Minerals Research Institute: 
Research Priorities Plan’ (Chamber of Minerals and Energy Western Australia, June 2013) 14. 
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in WA will continue to decline
42
 and that any exploration activity that can occur 
will be in ‘more challenging exploration environments.’43  
B  Memorandum of Understanding with the COMESA States 
The purpose of COMESA is to build an integrated economic market for the 19 
member states ‘through the implementation of common policies and programmes 
aimed at achieving sustainable growth and development.’44 The purpose of the 
MOU is ‘to establish a working relationship between the parties based on 
equality, overall reciprocity and mutual benefit’45 in the ‘field of mineral and 
petroleum resources, agriculture, vocational training, and capacity building.’46  
The MOU has three broad objectives:  
To establish a basis for development of vocational training and capacity 
building in mineral and petroleum resources, agriculture and agribusiness: 
To promote investment in vocational training and capacity building in the 
fields of mining and petroleum exploration and development, and 
agriculture and agribusiness; and: 
To encourage and foster investment generally as well as specifically in the 
area of transfer of mining and petroleum related technology in the 19 
COMESA member states and Western Australia.
47
 
The third clause of the MOU details the scope of cooperation between the parties. 
A number of ‘areas of interest’48 are detailed in this clause; however, for the 
purposes of this paper, the following provision is most relevant:   
                                                          
42
  Ibid.  
43
  Ibid 13.   
44
  COMESA MOU 2. 
45
  Ibid clause 1.  
46
  Ibid 1. 
47
  Ibid clause 4. 
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Promotion of strategies for investment in minerals and petroleum and the 
development of linkages.
49
 
Since signing the MOU, a Joint Working Group (‘JWG’) has been established. 
An undated communique issued on the COMESA website notes that the JWG 
proposed that COMESA member states should participate in the upcoming ADU 
conference. It was anticipated that attendance at ADU would provide the 
COMESA Member States with an opportunity to ‘showcase their mineral 
potential.’50 Representatives from eight COMESA Member States (Kenya, 
Malawi, Ethiopia, Comoros, Zambia, Seychelles, Sudan and Madagascar) 
attended ADU in September 2014.
51
  
The commercial aim of the MOU is to provide economic opportunities to WA and 
to COMESA Member States through information exchange. On 3 September 
2014, the Government of Western Australia released a media statement that 
quoted Mr Barnett and Mr Marmion, the current Western Australian Minister for 
Mines and Petroleum. Firstly, Mr Barnett stated:  
Western Australia has a world class system of legislation and regulation 
governing its mineral and petroleum sectors, and we want to pass on our 
experience to assist African countries in building resources industries that 
are profitable, safe and beneficial to their citizens.
52
 
Mr Marmion stated:  
                                                                                                                                                              
48
  Ibid clause 3. 
49
  Ibid clause 3.  
50
  COMESA Secretariat, COMESA – Western Australia forms Working Group to Implement 
MOU States Seek Investors in Mining, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
<http://www.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1213:comesa-
western-australia-form-working-group-to-implement-mou&catid=5:latest-news&Itemid=41>. 
51
  COMESA Secretariat, COMESA States Seek Investors in Mining, Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa 
<http://www.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1320:comesa-
states-seek-australia-investors-in-mining&catid=5:latest-news&Itemid=41>. 
52
 Government of Western Australia, ‘Western Australia Forges Mining Ties with Africa’ (Media 
Statement, 3 September 2014) 
<http://www.mediastatements.wa.gov.au/Pages/StatementDetails.aspx?StatId=8595&listName
=StatementsBarnett>. 
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The primary aim of the MOU is to tap into Western Australia’s expertise to 
help African nations to further develop their mining laws, tenement 
systems, and environmental and safety standards. 
53
 
According to a report by Paydirt Media, Mr Barnett perceives that ‘African 
countries see Australia as a respected, trusted, mid-level power’ and he sees this 
as advantageous to Australia.
54
 However, while he advocates that WA can help 
those African countries still in the early stages of developing their mining 
industries, such an offer necessarily calls into question whether WA’s experience 
of mineral resources development is aligned with Africa’s goals of inclusive and 
sustainable development of its mineral endowment. 
C  The Rhetoric of Mining 
There are parallels between the rhetoric regarding the current interest in resource 
development in African countries and the WA boom in mineral investment of the 
1950s and 1960s. During the 1950s and 1960s, mineral production in WA 
boomed and diversified from gold into other minerals (such as kyanite, antimony , 
asbestos and iron ore, nickel and alumina) to meet the world market demand for 
minerals suitable for reconstruction, industrialisation and rearmament during the 
post war period.
55
 WA saw the promotion of its mining industries as a means to 
move beyond being the country’s ‘Cinderella State.’56 An Australian ‘Cinderella 
State’ is one that is entirely reliant on rural exports, possessing very little industry 
and experiencing a much slower rate of growth than the other states.
57
 To combat 
this perception, mining was seen as a vehicle to move WA from the national and 
international periphery.
58
 Similarly, Africa sees its mineral resources as the key to 
its development; the catalyst that will improve the economic condition of many 
                                                          
53
 Ibid.   
54
  Piper, above n 21, 29.  
55
  Jasmina Brankovich, John McIlwraith and Ken Spillman, The MERIWA Effect, A History of 
the Minerals and Energy Research Institute of Western Australia (University of Western 
Australia Press, 2003) 6. 
56
  Elizabeth J Harman, ‘Ideology and Mineral Development in Western Australia, 1960 – 1980’ 
in Elizabeth J Harman and Brian W Head (eds), State, Capital and Resources in the North and 
West of Australia (University of Western Australia Press, 1982) 167, 175. 
57
  John McIlwraith, ‘The Importance of Minerals’ (1973) 1(5) World Development 65, 76-77. 
58
  Harman, above n 56, 175. 
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African countries, moving them from low income and fragile states to 
comfortable middle income states. According to the AMV, Africa ‘is the world’s 
top producer of numerous mineral commodities and has the world’s greatest 
resources of many more.’59  
In both WA and Africa, mineral resource development is seen as being capable of 
propelling economic and social development. In line with such views regarding 
the benefits of mineral resource endowment, certain development ideologies 
emerge. It is arguable that WA mineral policy was constructed, refined and 
disseminated by Sir Charles Court over the course of his political career. Sir 
Charles Court was appointed Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party in 1957.
60
 In 
1959 he was appointed the Minister for Industrial Development, Railways and the 
North-West and he eventually became the Premier of WA in 1974.
61
 He has been 
honoured ‘as a great builder of our state.’62 Undoubtedly, his legacy is based on 
his opposition towards a ‘timid policy of development.’63 The third part of this 
paper will discuss in more detail the effect of Sir Charles Court’s development 
ideology on the development of WA’s mining industry and the laws that regulate 
it. 
Africa, through the actions of certain of its governments and development bodies, 
has also spent many years devising mineral resource development strategies. 
While it is not possible to discuss every policy or strategy document drafted, 
some examples are listed herein. In 1997, at the Second Conference of African 
Ministers Responsible for the Development and Utilisation of Mineral and Energy 
Resources in Africa, the ‘Durban Declaration on the Sub-Regional and Regional 
Cooperation for the Development and Efficient Utilisation of Energy and Mineral 
Resources in Africa’ was adopted.  In 2000, West African Economic and 
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Monetary Union states
64
 agreed to adopt a common mining policy and legislation, 
and to harmonise their fiscal codes. In February 2004 the AMP was launched. The 
AMP sought to coordinate the mining and mineral related initiatives that formed 
part of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (‘NEPAD’), a strategic 
framework adopted in Africa in 2001.
65
 In 2007, the Big Table on ‘Managing 
Africa’s Natural Resources for Growth and Poverty Reduction’ was held in 
Ethiopia.
66
 The purpose of the Big Table was to consider how best to address the 
challenges of managing Africa’s natural resources for the purposes of broad based 
growth and poverty reduction. Finally, a central policy statement for Africa’s 
minerals industry, the Africa Mining Vision, was adopted in 2009. The value of 
the AMV is that the initiatives enunciated herein, and many others, have driven 
the formulation of this central policy statement.
67
 
III  DOMINANT NARRATIVES 
It is arguable that WA’s mineral industry policy development has been 
predominantly shaped by seeking to promote favourable conditions for investors. 
Having successfully courted investors, WA has then benefitted from the 
favourable perceptions of these investors. However, the perceptions held by 
foreign governments and investors of the attempts by African governments to 
frame their own mineral resource policies have often been constrained by certain 
narratives. The first two of these narratives, resource curse and Dutch disease, are 
discussed below.   
A  The Resource Curse 
Mining is a significant global industry. Between 2002 and 2010 the nominal value 
of world mineral production nearly quadrupled.
68
 This resources boom was driven 
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by increasing demand in emerging economies, such as China
69
 and India.
70
 
Globally, many economies have responded to this demand: in 1996, 29 countries 
relied on mineral exports (excluding fossil fuels which include coal and gas) and 
by 2010 that number had increased to 40 countries.
71
 A country is classified as 
mineral dependent if minerals make up more than 25% of its tangible exports.
72
 
According to the Oxford Policy Management report, by 2010 more than 80% of 
mineral dependant states were low and middle income countries.
73
 Further the 
report also states that nearly half of the mineral dependent countries are located in 
Africa.
74
  
In the current dominant narrative of the resource curse, the problems associated 
with this dependency seem clear. However, as noted by Rosser,
75
 early 
‘conventional wisdom’ held that the occurrence of natural resources was a 
positive event for developing countries and their existence could be harnessed by 
these countries to assist them in the transition to ‘industrial “take-off.”’76 
Coincidentally, at the time that African countries were moving towards 
independence, views about the impact of natural resource endowment on 
economic growth in developing countries began to shift. By the late 1990s, this 
new view on the impact of natural resource endowment, in its simplest form, held 
that countries with an abundance of natural resources often experienced slower 
growth than those countries without natural resource abundance.
77
 In 1997, 
Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner wrote that Africa’s ‘colonial legacy … may 
help to explain …Africa’s poor choices of economic policy.’78 However, 
arguably, Sachs and Warner then posited an explanation for Africa’s slow growth 
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that decoupled it from Africa’s colonial legacy.79 It is debatable that suggesting 
that the causes of Africa’s economic growth can be disentangled from the impact 
of the colonisation gives credence to a theory of development that suggests that 
the market, as an external factor, can take the lead in addressing broader 
development issues. On this point, Sachs and Warner suggest that African 
countries would benefit from ‘an openness to international trade, government 
saving and market-supporting institutions.’80 
Richard Auty, in his book ‘Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies’ 
(published in 1993) provides an encapsulation of the resource curse theory. He 
also notes the emergence of evidence positing that the impact of the resource 
curse is amplified in low and middle income countries.
81
 Auty suggests one 
explanation for the occurrence of the resource curse is that ‘smaller resource-
deficient’ economies are forced to focus on ‘competitive manufactured exports’ to 
overcome foreign exchange deficiencies. He posits that by the time larger 
resource based economies face the same foreign exchange deficiencies; the vested 
interests that benefit from resource rents make policy reform difficult.
82
  
Auty notes the ‘counterintuitive’ nature of the resource curse theory since mineral 
resource industries should be expected to provide the host country with additional 
foreign exchange, taxation and ‘an extra route to industrialisation.’83 Citing his 
own earlier research, he posits that there are two main factors that contribute to 
the resource curse effect. The first factor is the inflow of large amounts of foreign 
capital investment in to a capital intensive industry. The second factor is the use 
by mining proponents of foreign labour instead of local labour.
84
 The combined 
effect of these actions results in the creation of an enclave industry.
85
 The effect 
of a mining enclave is that most (if not all) of the financial benefits of mineral 
resource development flow out of the host country. For instance, the mineral 
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resource itself leaves the country, the profit leaves the country and the income 
paid to foreign workers does not penetrate the host country’s economy. Therefore 
the only way for a host country to gain a financial benefit from the investment is 
through the taxes levied against the project.
86
  
B  Dutch Disease 
Another aspect of being a mineral dependent country is that such reliance on one 
sector leaves the host country susceptible to the ‘Dutch disease.’ Dutch disease is 
‘the coexistence within the traded goods sector of progressing or declining, or 
booming and lagging, sub-sectors.’87 The Oxford Dictionary of Economics states 
that Dutch disease occurs when: 
The effect of an increase in one form of net exports [drives] up a country’s 
exchange rate, which handicaps the sale of other exports and impairs the 
ability of domestic products to compete with imports. 
Max Corden and Peter Neary, co-authors of the seminal paper on Dutch disease, 
acknowledge the effect of the Dutch disease is not isolated to the extractive 
industries or to developing countries.
88
 They state that the Dutch disease can 
occur in any country which has any combination of booming and lagging sectors. 
Notwithstanding these assertions, Auty effectively narrows the focus of the 
impact of the Dutch disease when he states that: 
[d]eveloping countries find commodity windfalls difficult to deploy 
prudently. They tend to promote too rapid a rate of domestic absorption so 
that they amplify the boom effects.
89
  
In addition to the fiscal impact of the resource curse, it has also been argued that 
the resource curse is correlated to certain social and political effects. The former 
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President of the United States, Bill Clinton, asked this question ‘Why is it that 
countries that are so rich in resources are so deficient in democratic resource?’90 
Rhuks Ako and Nilopar Uddin address this question by suggesting four 
subcategories of ‘democratic resource.’ They suggest that a commitment to 
democratic values, respect for the rule of law, government accountability and 
transparency and, finally, the management of natural resource revenues are 
critical.
91
 They also assert that the ‘mismanagement of resource revenues by 
African leadership … is the fundamental cause of the resource curse [in 
Africa].’92 This statement illustrates a further narrative that has constrained 
Africa’s development.  
IV  THE HISTORY OF MINING IN AFRICA 
A discussion of the dominant narrative of the resource curse in Africa cannot be 
disconnected from a discussion of the effects of colonial rule. Further, discussing 
the effects of colonial rule cannot be disconnected from discussing the effects of 
the global economy. In the developmental battle between the ‘first-comers’ and 
‘late-comers’, it has been argued that the late-comers provide the raw materials 
that have supported the ‘rich, industrialised and powerful’ first-comers.93 For the 
‘late-comers’, such as African countries, the effect of colonial rule, the business 
models of mining companies and the impact of free trade has resulted in the 
confinement of their mineral industries to the production of primary goods for 
multinational companies in the global market.
94
  
Prior to colonial rule, Africa had a locally integrated mining industry. African 
societies prospected, mined, smelted and forged iron for local trade. Each stage of 
the production process required certain skills and these were supplied by the local 
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community.
95
 For instance, mining in the Copper belt region of northern Zambia 
and Southern DRC (‘Democratic Republic of Congo’) is not a recent 
phenomenon, nor particularly attributable to the technological advances of 
colonialism as ‘there have hardly been any copper producing areas in the 
twentieth century that were not worked before.’96 African countries were also 
significant exporters of gold.
97
 Overall, rock salt deposits were the main 
commodity mined and traded in Africa before colonial intervention. 
98
 However, 
the true scale of pre-colonial mining in Africa is difficult to determine as colonial 
prospecting and mining industries often destroyed the physical evidence of earlier 
mining activities.
99
  
Between 1870 and 1929, local African mining was replaced by a ‘colonially-
induced pattern’ of mining production.100 While some academics may accept the 
benign assertion that African technological mining advances were ‘somehow 
truncated’ by colonial intervention,101 in effect this restructuring of African 
economies ‘largely destroyed the self-sufficiency of pre-capitalist agricultural 
economies.’102 The colonial states used Africa as one large mining pit and the 
African people as forced labour. In addition to the subversion of local mining, the 
foreign owned mining enclaves brought in workers from their own countries, thus 
displacing African labour to the low-skilled, low waged and dangerous tasks.
103
 
Aggressive labour recruitment policies, for instance, the application of ‘exclusive 
recruiting zones’ and the use of labour recruiters, who ‘press-ganged able-bodied 
men; leading them with ropes tied around their necks’ to work in the mines,104 
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resulted in up to half of the male population being removed from their local 
districts to work away in the mines.
105
 In the absence of the men, women, 
children, the sick and the old were forced to maintain the rural economy.
106
  
The subjugation of African countries’ people and mineral resources to colonial 
interests continued during the Second World War when the African mineral 
industries rapidly expanded ‘to meet the demands of the Allied war machine.’107 
At the end of the Second World War, Africa’s resources were diverted to colonial 
interests again. For instance, it was more economically prudent for France and 
Britain to develop mineral resources in their African territories that were within 
the sterling and franc monetary zone rather than purchase minerals on the open 
market.
108
 It has been stated the effect of this policy was that African countries 
were ‘forced to make low-interest loans to rebuild European industry while the 
continent languished in poverty.’109 By this point in time, the enclave nature of 
mining in Africa was firmly embedded.  
A  Independence 
In 1960 the United Nations passed the ‘Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960).’110  The Declaration was 
put forward by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in September 1960 and it 
sought ‘the final and complete liquidation of the colonial system’ which it called 
‘the most shameful phenomenon in the life of mankind.’111 The United Kingdom, 
in response to the comments of the Russian Ambassador, argued that the 
transition to independence by African countries was ‘an inspiring example of 
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harmony between all communities in the Territory.’112 Then, Mario Cardoso, the 
Congolese Ambassador to the United Nations spoke.
113
  
[60]…The colonialists of the West and East alike, too long accustomed to 
thinking of Africa as the perfect country for colonisation, now seem bent on 
‘decolonising’ it. In obedience to the wave of new ideas, they intend to 
‘decolonise’ at any cost, as if to ease their consciences. But Africa remains 
vigilant and refuses to be taken in by the pedlars of good intentions. 
[61] … They act as though they were dealing not only with economic and 
social under-development, but also with congenital intellectual under-
development.
114
 
African countries gained independence over a significant period of time. The 
earliest countries to become independent nations were Liberia (1847) and Egypt 
(1922). The majority of African countries became independent between 1951 and 
1977.
115
 As African countries became independent nations, the colonial 
governments that had previously governed the African ‘territories’ acted to 
protect their interests. To defend their supply of mineral resources, these 
governments undertook a significant amount of prospecting and started many new 
mining projects.
116
 This meant that, at the time of independence, African 
governments were faced with mining industries that displayed many of the 
features of the resource curse. For instance, the mines were foreign owned and the 
earnings were repatriated. In addition, mining operations had weak linkages with 
the rest of the local economy; and mining was a substantial or the biggest source 
of revenue to African governments as minerals dominated export trade.
117
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Upon independence, African governments sought to ‘enhanc[e] their share of 
returns from the nation’s mineral resources’118 and sought ‘fundamental change 
… in the colonial economic structure.’ 119 One method by which African 
governments sought to effect these changes was by nationalising the mineral 
industries.  To this end, African governments established ownership through 
vesting minerals in the state, establishing state mining enterprises and taking up 
‘substantial shares in existing mining companies.’120 African governments also 
sought to promote the building of processing plants in Africa. It is reported that 
these steps had limited success. While mining companies would cede majority 
ownership to African governments, they would often maintain effective control of 
the project ‘through management, advisory and sales contracts, and by reinforcing 
the rights of minority shareholders.’121 In addition, attempts to diversify the 
mining industries into value added industries were generally unsuccessful. For 
instance, the Ghanaian government was unsuccessful in its attempts to have an 
aluminium smelter constructed as part of the Volta Dam Project.
122
 The level of 
control that foreign interests had over Africa’s mineral industries was well 
understood:   
the mining industry’s position was very secure, since any post-
independence government, lacking expertise and capital, would depend on 
expatriate firms to maintain operations and continue generating wealth.
123
  
B  Indebtedness 
By the early 1980s many African countries were severely indebted.
124
 At least 
two narratives explain this debt crisis. Percy S Mistry, in a publication for the 
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Forum on Debt and Development (‘FONDAD’), an independent policy research 
centre associated with The Hague, sets out two narratives. The first, arguably 
dominant, narrative suggests that Africa’s debt crisis is as the result of  
poor governance, rapacious and corrupt leaders, protracted civil war in too 
many countries…, no democratic checks or balances on government 
borrowing and spending, excessive population growth, and the stubborn 
pursuit of economic policies which contributed to the relentless 
impoverishment of a rich continent for over two decades.
125
  
The second explanation offered by Mistry does not entirely discount the first 
narrative above. In this second narrative, Mistry suggests that a number of reasons 
have contributed to African indebtedness and he highlights twelve factors.  The 
first factor is over-lending by private and official lenders during the commodity 
boom. The second factor is the ‘lax monetary and fiscal policies’ that, coupled 
with negative real interest rates during the 1970s, created an economic climate 
that supported Africa in external borrowing for development and consumption.
126
  
The third factor is posited to be the provision to African countries, particularly oil 
exporting countries, with easy credit as a means of protecting industrialised 
countries from the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979. The impact of the global 
monetary shock of 1979 to 1981 which resulted in developing countries being 
plunged into a 70 month long recession is specified as the fourth contributing 
factor. Fifthly, African overreliance on external savings in the period of 1979 to 
1983 in the belief, supported by some international financial institutions, that the 
commodity price collapse of that time would be short-lived. The sixth factor is the 
drought of 1981 to 1984, which impaired Africa’s agricultural industry. The 
seventh factor is the ‘high, positive real interest rates’ of the 1980s which 
exacerbated Africa’s debt position. The eighth factor is the depreciation of the US 
dollar during the 1980s which had the effect of increasing the dollar value of 
African debt. The ninth factor is repeated debt rescheduling. The tenth factor is 
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the effect of bad advice from international finance institutions regarding how to 
negotiate African debt relief. The eleventh factor is allowing the debt of African 
countries to accrue to ‘egregious arrears’ and the final factor is the effect of 
protectionism in the world markets making it difficult for Africa to compete and 
impinging potential trade revenues.
127
   
To manage the debt crisis, global financial institutions advised African countries 
to open their markets.
128
 However, as noted by Kamran Kousari (a special 
coordinator for Africa at UNCTAD),
129
 the ‘promises held out by the neoclassical 
case for free trade … has not transpired’130 in African countries. Kousari posits 
that trade openness has most often been successful in those countries that were 
already internationally competitive. It is his view that to suggest that African 
countries embrace trade openness in order to become competitive confuses 
correlation with causality.
131
 Touching on a repeated narrative regarding Africa’s 
development, Kousari notes that the failure of trade liberalisation in African 
countries is often attributed to ‘bad institutions or governance failure.’132 
However he asserts that successful development, and the institutions and 
mechanisms that surround it, are often realised through ‘painful historic 
processes.’133 It is his view that the factors that should properly be categorised as 
the causes of economic development are often improperly constructed by 
advanced economies as the prerequisites of economic development.
 134
 Again, 
correlation and causality are confused.  
In response to the persistent narrative that African governments are solely 
responsible for the debt crisis, Mistry writes: 
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[t]he creditor community … must acknowledge the tremendous harm that 
their own ex- and neo-colonial machinations have done to crippling the 
capacity of independent Africa to sustain itself.  
It is too easy for the creditor community … to walk away from the damage 
that it has contributed so much to doing on the grounds that it cannot be 
held responsible for the egregious domestic excesses of African leaderships 
and governments.
135
 
Notwithstanding the many factors that contributed to African indebtedness, the 
WBG advised African countries to attract investment from foreign mining 
companies.
136
 The basis for and impact of the WBG advice is discussed below. 
V  WORLD BANK RESPONSES 
In 2011, the ECA and AU released a document titled ‘Minerals and Africa’s 
Development: The International Study Group Report on Africa’s Mineral 
Regimes’ (‘ISG Report’). The ISG Report documents the historical context of 
African mining and the goal for African mining to ‘change the path and destiny of 
Africa’s industrialisation and fight against poverty.’137  
The ISG Report states that during the 1980s WBG intervention into Africa 
increased as African countries became enmeshed in debt.
138
 The WBG’s focus on 
Africa intensified as the debt problems of African countries became exacerbated 
by declining mineral revenues. This decline was due to the glut of mineral 
production in the mid-1980s causing base metal prices to drop.
139
 The ISG Report 
states that the WBG held the view that the problem of Africa’s poor performance 
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in the mineral industry was attributable to two factors. Firstly, the WBG noted the 
rapid decline of Africa’s mineral industries and evidenced this assertion by 
reference to Africa’s declining mineral output. Secondly, the WBG asserted that a 
lack of exploration activity impacted on the production of new geological data. In 
turn, the lack of new geological data had the impact of dissuading further 
exploration investment.
140
 The ISG Report asserts that it was the overall view of 
the WBG that ‘Africa had simply not adapted well to the needs of the industry in 
the new international context.’141 Accordingly, the WBG sought to determine how 
African countries could adapt to meet the needs of the mining industry, and so it 
issued a survey to 80 mining companies. 
A  Strategy for African Mining 
In 1992, the World Bank published a technical paper titled ‘Strategy for African 
Mining’ (WBG Strategy Document). The ISG Report notes that the WBG 
Strategy Document was the ‘first systematic presentation of reforms that [the 
WBG] considered necessary to tackle Africa’s poor performance in minerals.’142 
At less than 100 pages in length, the WBG Strategy Document seems a desultory 
offering. However, notwithstanding the briefness of the document, it reported the 
reasons for the demise of Africa’s mining performance.143 In light of the waves of 
WBG assisted liberalising mining reform discussed below, the fact the WBG 
Strategy Document advocated that African governments should make maximising 
tax revenues a primary objective in preference to exerting control over resources 
or the creation of employment
 144
 is quite interesting. It is arguable that the WBG 
interventions (discussed below) had the overall effect of minimising the potential 
tax base from minerals industries in African countries.  
The first chapter of the WBG Strategy Document discussed the current situation 
(as at 1992) of Africa’s mining industries. In effect, this chapter pitted private 
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mining enterprises against state owned mining enterprises. In its assessment, the 
WBG asserted that African countries had only two options for minerals 
development. On the one hand, African countries could pursue a policy of state 
controlled mining activity. However, it was the WBG’s view that such a policy 
would be hampered by the public sector’s inability to ‘mobilize … the large 
amounts of managerial, technical and financial resources necessary for 
commercial-scale mining development.’145 Alternatively, African countries could 
encourage private investment. The WBG asserted that ‘[t]he record is clear – 
mineral growth in Africa [had] been predominantly achieved by the private 
sector.’146 The WBG Strategy Document also advocated for a split in 
responsibility for mineral industries development: governments should regulate 
and promote the industry and private companies should ‘take the lead in 
operating, managing and owning mineral enterprises.’147  
The second chapter of the WBG Strategy Document asserted that the geological 
potential of a country or region is ‘the fundamental factor’ leading to exploration 
and investment.
148
 The WBG emphasised that exploration was critical to the 
existence of any other stage of minerals development and, further, that only 
private mining companies had stayed abreast of the technological advances 
required for exploration.
149
 Given these factors, the WBG stated that it was 
critical for African countries to attract investors to undertake exploration 
activities. 
The third chapter of the WBG Strategy Document is titled ‘Attracting the 
Investor.’150 In this chapter, the WBG argued that foreign investment was critical 
if Africa was to ‘close the exploration gap.’151 In order to formulate a policy for 
African countries to attract investors, the WBG issued an enterprise survey to 80 
international mining companies to assess investor perceptions of mining in 
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Africa.
152
 Of the 80 surveys issued, 46 replies were received. The data from 40 of 
these replies was analysed.
153
 The results of the survey obviously not only 
informed the content of the WBG Strategy Document but arguably also informed 
the subsequent WBG led mining reforms in Africa. It is of concern that a strategy 
for mining in Africa, a continent constituted of 54 recognised sovereign states, 
nine territories and two de facto independent states,
154
 with varied jurisdictions 
(for instance, common law, civil law, Islamic Law and customary law) and 
multiple languages (English, French, Portugese and Kiswahili) was formulated 
from so few responses.  
The survey respondents included 19 North American companies, seven Australian 
companies, 12 European companies, one South African company and one 
Japanese company.
155
 Notwithstanding the exceptionally limited data set, certain 
themes emerged from the survey. Firstly, the survey noted that the primary factor 
for mineral investment was mineral potential and infrastructure. According to the 
WBG Strategy Document, companies were prepared to be the first company 
exploring in a region if ‘there are good [mineral] prospects.’156 In addition, the 
WBG Strategy Document stated that foreign investors preferred to operate in 
countries where there was an established mining code setting out mining rights 
and providing security of tenure.
157
 Other important factors to entice foreign 
investment included contractual stability, ‘guaranteed fiscal regime[s]’, profit 
repatriation and access to foreign exchange.
158
 Mandatory local majority control 
or participation were categorised as significant disincentives to investment 
(‘respondents are generally not prepared to work in countries with mandatory 
local majority participation’),159 although local participation and mandatory 
training of nationals were considered to be positive factors.
160
 Overall, foreign 
companies’ ranked corruption and political risk as more concerning to them than 
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macro-economic issues.
161
 The WBG Strategy Document made it clear that the 
reason foreign companies were not concerned by macroeconomic risks was that 
‘mining projects are export-oriented and more readily isolated from the national 
economy.’162 Finally, the survey also indicated that foreign investors reported 
requiring a higher return in a shorter time frame for investments in Africa.
163
 
From the limited data collected by the survey, it was deduced that political risk 
was the factor that ultimately caused companies to hesitate to invest in developing 
countries.
164
 In particular, the surveyed companies were concerned that changes 
to ‘the rules of the game’ affecting mining rights, taxation arrangements and 
access to foreign exchange could adversely impact on their investments.
165
 
Ultimately, the WBG Strategy Document advocated that African countries should 
seek to reduce the risks of mining investment for foreign investors.
166
 
B  Generations of African mining reform 
The WBG continued the mining sector reforms that it had commenced in 1988.
167
 
In 2004, Groupe de recherche sur les activités minières en Afrique (‘GRAMA’) 
released a discussion paper titled ‘Regulating Mining in Africa: for whose 
benefit?’ GRAMA is a part of the Centre Études Internationales et Mondialisation 
of the Faculty of Political Science and Law at the Université du Québec à 
Montréal (‘UQAM’). The discussion paper was edited by Bonnie Campbell, a 
Professor in the Department of Political Science. She has expertise in economics 
and politics; development assistance in mining and quarrying; and African 
governance, in particular in capacity building and reconceptualization of the 
state.
168
 The discussion paper is instructive as it discusses the three waves of 
WBG assisted mining code reforms in Africa. The discussion paper concluded 
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that the WBG was ‘at times caught between contradictory and sometimes 
incompatible logics’ by seeking to reduce poverty and promote sustainable 
development while concurrently seeking foreign private investment.
169
 These 
contradictory and incompatible logics are discussed below. 
1  The First Generation of WBG Assisted Mining Reform 
The introduction of the discussion paper states that since 1995 at least 35 African 
mining codes had been revised with the assistance of the WBG.
170
 The first 
generation of mining sector reforms for African countries was based upon 
structural adjustment programmes. These programmes had the goal of removing 
state involvement in Africa’s mining sector.171 The Ghanaian experience is 
illustrative of the WBG’s first generation of mining reform. Thomas Akabzaa, in 
in his contribution titled ‘Mining Legislation and Net Returns from Mining in 
Ghana’172 stated that in the period of 1983 to 1998, Ghana attracted over $6 
billion in private investment capital into its mining sector.
173
 This increased 
foreign investment occurred in a regulatory environment supported by the WBG 
that advocated for the ‘complete government withdrawal from participation in 
minerals projects, lowering royalties, permanency of mineral rights, and a review 
of the role of the state in the mining sector.’174  
As part of the WBG supported mining reforms, Ghanaian corporate income tax 
rates were reduced from 50-55% in 1975 to 35% in 1994. Thresholds for capital 
investment recoupments were significantly increased from 20% in the first year of 
production in 1975 to 75% by 1986. In addition, the royalty rate was reduced 
from 6% in 1975 to 3% in 1987.
175
 Further, associated taxes, such as the mineral 
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duty, the import duty and the foreign exchange tax were all abolished.
176
 Akabzaa 
reported that mining operations in Ghana were often open pit mine operations 
with short lifespans.
177
 Consequently, the WBG mining reforms had the effect of 
providing companies with a tax holiday for such projects, as the reserves were 
often depleted and the mines closed before operators paid any corporate income 
tax.
178
 Akabzaa further asserted that the financial linkages of mining into Ghana 
were further eroded by the high amount of export earnings retained in foreign 
accounts. Using the measure of retained value (the share of the total value of 
production retained within the host country), the Bank of Ghana estimated that 
71.2% of the value of mineral exports was held in offshore accounts.
179
 However, 
he also stated that this did not mean that the real retained value to Ghana was 
28.8%. Akabzaa argued that this figure was ‘inflated’ as it did not take into 
account the import costs for products and consumables required by the mineral 
industries.
180
 Overall, despite impressive financial returns to the mining 
companies, poorly constructed taxation regimes and the inability to control the 
amount of earnings retained in offshore accounts, mining contributed only 2% to 
Ghana’s GDP.181 It is arguable that Ghana’s tax base was eroded by WBG 
assisted reform (which is the antithesis of the assertion in the WBG Strategy 
Document that African countries should prioritise maximising tax revenues).   
2  The Second Generation of WBG Assisted Mining Reform 
Bonnie Campbell, in her contribution to the discussion paper ‘Guinea: 
Deregulation and Its Consequences for Environmental Protection’182 considered 
the second generation of WBG mining reforms and its impact on the development 
of Guinea’s environmental policy.183 It is apparent that the second generation of 
reform illustrates the WBG’s strengthening adherence to the ideology that private 
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enterprise, acting in response to the competitive open market, can respond to 
broader development considerations.
 184
 In particular, the paper states: 
The increasing move towards economic liberalisation accompanied by 
measures of deregulation and privatisation after the early 1990s appears to 
have been accompanied by an increasingly segmented approach in which 
environmental issues were treated in abstraction from overall development 
patterns.
185
 
In the context of market liberalisation reforms, within a 12 month period, the 
WBG produced two environmental policy documents (Plan National d’Action 
pour l’Environnement (PNAE)) for Guinea. The 1993 PNAE explicitly linked 
environmental policy, sustainable development and poverty reduction.
186
 The 
1993 PNAE noted that 
The renewable and non-renewable resources of all the country represent 
essential aspects of the environment. Their development and rational 
management are the guarantee of the sustainable economic and social 
development of the nation as a whole.
187
 
However, by the time of the publication of the second PNAE in 1994, it was 
apparent that the WBG had reconsidered its position on the impact of mining on 
the Guinea’s environment. The discussion paper noted that the 1994 PNAE now 
attributes the environmental destruction in Guinea to population growth, rather 
than the impacts of mining.
188
 Campbell stated that this assertion was in direct 
opposition to the 1993 PNAE which had argued that it was difficult to show a 
direct link between population growth and environmental degradation.
189
 Overall, 
it was apparent that by the time it published the 1994 PNAE, the WBG had 
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subjugated the management of the environment in preference to policies that 
drove economic growth.
190
  
Campbell continued by noting that the WBG, having concluded that Guinea’s 
environmental problems were attributable to poverty and lack of economic 
growth,
191
 supported further economic liberalisation ‘which provide[d] a real 
possibility for exchange and access to factors of production and market products, 
as well as lasting disenclavement.’192 The WBG saw the role of the Guinean 
government as ‘minimalist and managerialist’ in constructing policies that would 
promote entrepreneurship into its mining industry while relegating environmental 
issues to a secondary issue, separated from policies for economic growth.
193
 On 
this point, it was concluded that the lack of consideration of the environmental 
impact of the mining sector, and the relegation of the role of the Guinean 
government to be simply one of creating policies to foster investment, left the 
management of environmental issues to private enterprise.
194
  
It is arguable that the second generation of mining reform contributed to the 
creation of more favourable investment conditions for mining investors. It is 
apparent that the role of the state in managing environmental concerns has been 
minimised. Instead the WBG appears to have advocated a policy based upon the 
ability of self-regulating markets ‘acting in response to the pressures of the free 
market’ to ensure ‘realistic sustainable environmental outcomes.’195  
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3  The Third Generation of WBG Assisted Mining Reform 
Pascale Hatcher, in his submission titled ‘Mali: Rewriting the Mining Code or 
Redefining the Role of the State?’196 examined Mali’s 1999 Mining Code as an 
illustrative example of the third wave of WBG mining reforms.
197
 Hatcher asserts: 
The introduction of a new code and the resulting changes in the 
government’s role raise certain issues regarding the current and future 
capacity of the government to pursue development objectives and, more 
basically, to guarantee its citizens’ fundamental rights.198  
In 1999, Mali reformed its mining code with WBG assistance.
199
 The goal of this 
reform was to make Mali ‘one of the major poles of African gold trade.’200 It was 
stated by Mali’s National Director of Geology and Mining, clearly in line with 
WBG policy regarding the respective roles of government and the private sector, 
that: 
The primary purpose of the mining policy adopted by the government in 
November 1998 is to substantially increase the contribution of mineral 
products to GDP. The strategy for implementation of this policy was to 
assign the private sector the role and mission of assuming the business risks 
…; the State will focus on the fundamental functions of establishing basic 
infrastructures, creating an environment conducive to investment, 
promoting the industry, etc.
201
 
According to Hatcher, under the 1999 Malian reforms, mining companies 
received a number of enticements to engage in exploration. For instance, Mali 
offered an ‘escalating annual fee per surface area’; this fee arrangement enabled 
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Mali to attract foreign investment on the basis that the mining companies would 
not be impacted ‘by charges considered too high by [it] in [the project’s] early 
stages.’202 Further, certified companies would ‘pay only some royalties … [and 
were] also exempt from paying turnover taxes … which might unduly burden the 
cost of exploration operations.’203 Then, once a project reached production, 
certified companies received significant tax exemptions during the first three 
accounting periods of production or mining.
204
 For instance, mining companies 
operating in Mali received exemptions from income tax on professional earnings, 
income tax on property income, registration and stamp duties, value added tax 
and service delivery tax, income tax on investment income, contribution on 
patents and tax on insurance policies.
205
  
Hatcher asserted that the gold industry in Mali was one of the main sources of 
government revenue. It was anticipated that Mali’s reliance on gold mining 
revenues would continue for at least another 10 years.
206
 In light of the centrality 
of the gold industry to Mali’s revenues, it is strongly arguable that by following 
WBG advice, the effect of these tax holidays and exemptions during the 
exploration and production phases, was to significantly erode Mali’s revenue base 
to such an extent that ‘the government [was] no longer able to assume its role 
with respect to supplying services.’207 In addition, compounding this problem, it 
was asserted that the Malian government had often sought to reduce its budget 
deficit by cutting already inadequate services, rather than by increasing its tax 
revenue. By avoiding tax revenue increases, it was expected that foreign investors 
would continue to be attracted to Mali’s gold industry.208  
The situation in Mali encapsulates the paradox of reliance on foreign investment. 
The WBG reforms may have contributed to Mali’s gold industry surviving the 
gold crisis that crippled the industry in other countries
209
 but the country also 
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remained one of the ten poorest countries on the planet.
210
 Further, despite 
increased foreign investment into the country’s mining industry, Mali’s 
government remained ‘starved for revenues’211 and as a consequence was 
severely limited in its ability to provide services.
212
 
Notwithstanding the ‘contradictory and sometimes incompatible logics’ of WBG 
policies, the WBG self-reports that its reforms ‘have often had spectacular results 
with respect to investment and good results with respect to institution building.’213 
However, by the end of the 20
th
 Century, WBG intervention into Africa and other 
developing countries was starting to be seriously questioned.  
(a) Anti-globalisation movement 
The end of the 20
th
 Century saw a wave anti-globalisation protests. In September 
2000, during this time of increased civil society agitation, the WBG met in 
Prague. This meeting was also beset by protests.
214
 Activists from developing 
countries, including Nicaraguan activist Andrea Morales and Clemente Wilson, of 
the Kuna Tribe of Panama’s San Blas Islands, protested against the exploitation 
and oppression of indigenous people by the processes of globalisation.
215
 
Importantly, during the Prague meetings, the WBG President, James Wolfensohn, 
was ‘challenged’ by Ricardo Navarro, Chairman of Friends of the Earth, on the 
impacts of the extractive industries projects that had received financing from the 
World Bank.
216
 Ricardo Navarro presented a petition calling on the WBG to cease 
funding oil, mining and gas projects.
217
 In response to this petition, James 
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Wolfensohn committed the WBG to an independent review of its investments into 
the extractive sectors.
218
  
VI  EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES REVIEW (EIR) 
The goal of the Extractive Industries Review (‘EIR’) was to determine whether 
WBG involvement in the extractive industries was consistent with its goal of 
poverty reduction.
219
 As the analysis and findings of the EIR are contained within 
six volumes of documents, it is not possible within this paper to traverse the 
minutiae of the EIR process. In conducting the EIR, Mr Emil Salam and the 
advisory group put together to assist in the EIR,
 220
 conducted five regional 
workshops. The focus of consideration in this paper is the regional workshop held 
in Mozambique in January 2003. The purpose of including this discussion is to 
assist in understanding some of the ground level impacts of WBG reforms in 
African countries.  
A  Regional Consultation Workshop for Africa – Civil Society Testimonials 
The purpose of the civil society testimonials was to provide a forum for ‘civil 
society to share their experiences of extractive industry projects … in a frank and 
open environment.’221 The testimony given by civil society covered projects 
funded by the WBG. The testimony relating to three of these interventions is 
briefly discussed herein: the Olkaria Geothermal Project in Kenya (‘Olkaria 
Project’), the Bulyanhulu gold mine in Tanzania and the Niger Delta Contractor 
Revolving Credit Facility. 
In relation to the Olkaria Project, environmental problems were documented by 
the Centre for Minority Development in Kenya (‘CIMD’) and the CIMD 
presented this testimony to the EIR.
222
 CIMD had recorded environmental 
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impacts from the Olkaria Project, such as toxic emissions and effluent being 
released into the environment surrounding the project.
223
 According to CIMD, the 
local community had reported suffering from chronic skin diseases. The 
community also reported the mysterious death of livestock, caused by 
contaminants from the Olkaria Project seeping into feeding grounds.
224
 CIMD 
also testified that the proponents of the Olkaria Project had promised to employ 
local people, but had only employed two local people in a workforce totalling 428 
people.
225
 In addition, the Maasai community had suffered the ongoing 
expropriation of land in relation to the Olkaria Project.
226
 On this point, CIMD 
testified that the Maasai were never consulted about the expropriation and, 
further, the expropriation of their land had forced the Maasai to abandon 
traditional livelihoods.
227
 
The Lawyer’s Environmental Action Team (‘LEAT’) provided testimony in 
relation to the impacts of the Bulyanhulu gold mine.
228
 LEAT testified that 
artisanal miners were forcibly removed from the area of the gold mine by the 
security forces of the Government of Tanzania ‘in cooperation with the Canadian 
mining company, Barrick Gold.’229 This forcible removal had resulted in 
‘impoverishment, marginalization and violation of rural communities.’230 LEAT 
testified that the Bulyanhulu region had been set aside for artisanal mining but 
that these rights had been undermined by the enactment of the new Mining Act
231
 
which had been promulgated with the assistance of the WBG.
232
 LEAT further 
testified that in June 1995, Barrick Gold sought court orders seeking to have 
artisanal miners evicted from the land. The High Court of Tanzania did not grant 
this order and referred Barrick Gold’s application to a hearing before a special 
constitutional court.
233
 However, in July 1996 and before the hearing, the 
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Tanzanian Minister for Minerals made an order evicting the local miners. In 
August 1996, an injunction was granted against the eviction; however, LEAT 
testified that the miners were immediately evicted. LEAT testified that Tanzanian 
artisanal miners were killed during the forcible eviction when their mine shafts 
were filled in by bulldozers.
234
 Zephania Luzama, a citizen of Tanzania and 
owner of eight mine shafts, witnessed the events and testified that two of his 
adopted sons were killed when they were buried alive in the mineshafts.
235
 
Melania Baesi also gave evidence that her two sons, one aged 20 years and the 
other 16 years of age, were buried alive in the mineshafts.
236
 Maalim Kadau 
testified that it was originally estimated that 52 people were buried in the 
mineshafts, but that this number had been increased as more people had come 
forward reporting missing relatives.
237
  
Testimony was also provided regarding the WBG’s involvement in the Niger 
Delta region.
238
 The Environmental Rights Action (‘ERA’) group, the Nigerian 
chapter of Friends of the Earth,
239
 testified to contentions allegedly made by the 
WBG in 1995 that neither oil spills nor gas flaring were major environmental 
problems for Nigeria. Further, the ERA’s testimony was that the WBG had stated 
that the oil spills would evaporate quickly in Nigeria’s tropical environment and 
the emissions from gas flaring were not toxic to health.
240
 On 1 June 2001, the 
ERA lodged a complaint with the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (‘CAO’), the 
independent ombudsman established in 1999, regarding the Niger Delta 
Contractor Revolving Credit Facility made between the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), Royal Dutch Shell (Shell) and a local bank. The purpose of the 
revolving credit facility was to enable the parties to it to provide ‘competitively 
priced term funding to small and medium sized local contractors … who 
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delivered services to Shell.’241 One of the grounds of the ERA’s complaint was 
that the IFC (as an arm of the WBG) in partnering with Shell did not appear to 
have addressed ‘the legacy of Shell’s involvement in Nigeria’242 such as the 
claims against Shell of human rights abuses and its disregard for ‘minimal 
environmental standards.’243  
During the African workshops, African civil society groups called on the WBG to 
impose a moratorium on oil, gas and mining investments until the social and 
environmental issues associated with WBG interventions could be properly 
addressed.
244
  
B  The Findings of the Report 
In December 2003 ‘The Final Report of the Extractive Industries Review’ (‘Final 
Report’) was released. Again, it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the 
minutia of the Final Report and instead some relevant points have been 
highlighted herein. The Final Report found that while WBG programmes had 
reformed mining regimes and these reforms had resulted in increased investment, 
these reforms may have exacerbated the already existing ‘knowledge, power, 
financial, and technical resource gaps’ that exist between mining companies, civil 
society, the governments of developing countries and local communities.
245
 In 
fact, the Final Report found that increased investment into extractive industries 
had often further marginalised the poor.
246
  
The Final Report stated there were ‘three main enabling conditions’ to align the 
extractive industries with the WBG’s goals of poverty reduction and sustainable 
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development.
247
 These enabling conditions were: pro poor governance, more 
effective social and environmental policies and respect for human rights. The 
Final Report made a number of recommendations for the improvement of WBG 
policies that would enable the WBG to promote investments into the extractive 
industries that were more closely aligned with these enabling conditions.
248
  
For instance, in meeting the enabling condition of pro poor governance, the Final 
Report advocated that the WBG should develop programmes tailored to the needs 
of the recipient country.
249
 Of concern, the Final Report found that the WBG had 
given insufficient attention to the development needs of poorly performing, 
resource abundant countries.
250
 While the WBG’s previous ‘structural reform 
programmes’ had increased extractive industries investment, such revenue was 
often not transferred to the affected communities.
251
 The Final Report noted that 
one of the reasons this occurred was that extractive industries development was 
often promoted ahead of addressing governance and market issues that could be 
harmful to the poor.
252
 In particular, the Final Report found that the governments 
of resource rich countries were reportedly interested in receiving WBG assistance 
to build diversified economies that relied on large and small companies and 
employment generation through creating value adding industries. However, the 
Final Report noted that the necessary research and development assistance to 
promote such goals had not been forthcoming from the WBG.
253
  
Another aspect of pro poor governance was the integration of small scale and 
artisanal mining into the formal sector.
254
 On this point, the Final Report noted the 
significant imbalance between the WBG’s support for large mining companies 
when compared to small scale projects and artisanal miners.
255
 In the period 1990-
2002, the IFC had provided around $100.8 million in funding each year to 
multinational mining companies. On the other hand, the Final Report estimated 
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that, in 2002, WBG support for small scale and artisanal mining totalled just 
$610,100. Further illustrating the need to integrate small scale and artisanal 
mining into the formal sector, the Final Report noted the number of people 
employed by each industry. In 2003 the global mining industry employed 
approximately 10 to 11 million people while artisanal and small scale mining 
employed an estimated 11 to 13 million people.
256
  
The second enabling condition was the creation of ‘more effective social and 
environmental policies.’257 The Final Report stated that this involved 
strengthening the environmental and social components of WBG interventions.
258
 
The Final Report noted the accidental release of two tonnes of sodium cyanide 
into the Barksoon River in Kyrgyzstan in 1998 and a spill of 300 pounds of 
mercury close to the Yanacocha mine in Peru in 2000. The WBG, through its 
associated bodies, was involved in financing these mines.
259
 The Final Report also 
found that the WBG had endorsed projects in biologically sensitive and protected 
areas. Climate change was another issue for consideration and the Final Report 
noted industry’s view that the WBG had a role to play in the promotion of a ‘low-
carbon economic growth strategy’ in developing countries. The Final Report 
recommended that the WBG should encourage developing countries to invest in 
the infrastructure required for ‘modern energy supplies’ rather than ‘watching 
them invest and install infrastructure for fossil fuels.’260  
The social cost of mining was also examined within the second enabling 
condition.  Two main issues were considered: worker health and safety
261
 and 
involuntary resettlement.
262
 Focussing on the issue of involuntary resettlement, 
the Final Report noted that the WBG’s policies allowed forced resettlement.263  
The WBG policy is that it ‘seeks to avoid involuntary resettlement, but there are 
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times when this is unavoidable.’264 However, the Final Report noted that 
companies had reported to the EIR that their view was that the WBG utilised 
involuntary resettlement too readily.
265
 The Final Report recommended the WBG 
should engage with local communities to seek ‘free prior and informed consent’ 
regarding resettlement. Such consent processes would mean that the WBG could 
only engage in voluntary resettlements.
266
 
The third enabling condition was respect for human rights.
267
 The Final Report 
stated that the WBG has obligations under international law to promote, respect 
and protect all human rights.
268
 Of concern, the Final Report recommended that 
the WBG must ‘internalise and respect’ the principle that ‘while development 
facilitates the enjoyment of all human rights, the lack of development may not be 
invoked to justify the abridgment of internationally recognised human rights.’269 
On the issue of labour rights, the Final Report noted the perceptions of the labour 
unions in developing countries that the WBG is ‘anti-worker.’270 In particular, the 
Final Report referred to the WBG publication ‘Doing Business in 2004’ that 
included recommendations for developing countries to ‘reduce the scope of 
employment legislation … reduce minimum wages, and … replace collective 
negotiation by contracts.’271  Returning to the issue of resettlement, the Final 
Report raised concerns about the impact of the extractive industries on indigenous 
populations; noting that the displacement of indigenous people from their 
traditional lands had potentially deleterious effects on their health and 
wellbeing.
272
 Finally, the Final Report discussed women’s’ rights.273 Here it was 
noted that women ‘are the most discriminated against, the most vulnerable, and 
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the least empowered members of many societies.’274 The Final Report concluded 
that the WBG paid little attention to women’s issues275 and seemed to assume that 
women would ‘automatically benefit’ from extractive industries projects.276  
1  Conclusions 
The EIR conducted an in-depth analysis of the impact of WBG extractive 
industries policies in developing countries. The Final Report found a significant 
number of issues that impacted upon the efficacy of WBG interventions to 
promote poverty reduction and sustainable growth. The testimony given by civil 
society at the African regional workshop gives an indication of the level of 
discontent regarding the impact of WBG interventions. The analysis above also 
details aspects of the African experience as an object of investment and 
development ideologies.
277
 For instance, it has been suggested that Africa’s 
contribution to determining the content of socially responsible investment policies 
in Africa has often been ignored or misunderstood.
278
 From the history outlined 
above, it is arguable that Africa’s contributions towards formulating policies to 
develop its extractive industries has also been ignored or misunderstood.   
The second part of this paper will consider Africa as an actor, or agent, seeking to 
devise its own development ideology for its mining industries. The analysis will 
then extend to a consideration of WA’s development ideologies. Noting that one 
of the purposes of the MOU signed by WA and the COMESA States is the 
promotion of strategies for investment into Africa’s mining industry and the 
development of linkages, such an examination will determine whether WA’s 
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experience of mining development is aligned with the ‘transformative agenda’279 
for African development expressed in the AMV.  
VII  BREAKING THE ENCLAVE 
The next part of this paper will discuss the central policy document for African 
mining development, the Africa Mining Vision. While this document is not the 
earliest expression of mining policy created by African countries, the relevance of 
the AMV is that it is a central statement of mining policy in Africa based upon the 
drafters’ review and consideration of the many regional, subregional and 
international policy programmes and documents that preceded it.
280
  
A  What is the enclave? 
The enclave model of natural resource extraction is conceptually linked to the 
resource curse and Dutch disease theory. As noted by Robin Bloch and George 
Owusu, ‘[A]n enclave economy is associated with a lack of productive, physical 
backward and forward linkages.’281 The Oxford Dictionary of Human Geography 
defines an enclave economy as ‘[a] foreign-owned export-based industrial zone 
… strongly linked with global flows but only weakly integrated with local 
areas.’282 UNECA notes that an enclave industry results from ‘concentrations of 
investment and unbalanced economic development.’283 It should be noted that 
mining enclaves operate in both developed and developing countries.
284
 To put 
the claims of mining as an enclave industry into context, it has been contended 
that mining, along with other primary production industries, can be more easily 
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marked with the label of an ‘enclave’285 because the combined effect of the export 
of the raw outputs of mining and the lack of integration of the industry into the 
local economy is so easily recognised.
286
 However, as stated by the Africa 
Progress Panel (‘APP’), in its 2013 annual report, titled ‘Equity in Extractives – 
Stewarding Africa’s Natural Resources for All’ (‘APP Report’), enclave mining 
industries are ‘not a route to inclusive growth and shared prosperity.’287  
B  Why does Africa want to break the enclave? 
The APP Report states that ‘[B]reaking with the enclave model of natural 
resources extraction is [a] priority.’288 The APP refers to the AMV’s call upon 
African governments to ‘shift focus from simple mineral extraction to much 
broader developmental imperatives in which mineral policy integrates with 
development policy.’289 It is arguable that this represents an ideological break 
from the three generations of mining reforms overseen by the WBG in Africa. 
The creation of development linkages and the improvement of the operation of 
fiscal regimes are two of the methods by which the enclave nature of mining can 
be combatted.  There are many pressing reasons for African countries to seek to 
break the enclave; two reasons are discussed herein.  
1  Fragility 
The AfDB produced a strategy document titled ‘Addressing Fragility and 
Building Resilience in Africa: The African Development Bank Group Strategy 
2014-2019.’290 Building on its earlier policy documents addressing this issue,291 
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the AfDB estimates that 250 million African people are affected by fragility.
 292
 
The AfDB defines fragility as ‘a condition of elevated risk of institutional 
breakdown, societal collapse, or violent conflict.’293 
According to the AfDB, uneven economic growth is a contributing factor to 
fragility. On this point, the AfDB notes that while Africa has experienced fast 
growth, such growth has been narrowly concentrated in a few sectors and 
geographical areas.
294
 This type of growth results in exclusion, poverty, 
unemployment, high migration, rapid urbanisation, climate change and poor 
management of natural resources, and these are pressures that contribute to the 
fragility of African countries.
295
 In response to these pressures, the AfDB seeks to 
manage ‘the underlying drivers of fragility and building resilient states and 
societies through effective institutions, capacity building and partnerships.’296 In 
particular, addressing fragility means engaging with economic, social, political 
and environmental issues through ‘inclusive and equitable growth patterns that 
can meet societal expectations.’297 The AfDB also recognises that the drivers for 
inclusive and equitable growth are being intensified by ‘greater citizen’s demands 
for economic empowerment, political inclusion and justice.’298 Amongst a 
number of factors, the AfDB identifies two issues that are critical to driving 
socially acceptable inclusive and economic growth. The first issue is access to 
employment
299
 and the second issue is the unequal distribution (whether actual or 
perceived) of the benefits of the extractives industries.
300
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2  Access to employment 
The AfDB makes investment in human capital a central goal of its strategy,
301
 as 
developing Africa’s human capital is recognised as being critically important in 
combatting poverty and social exclusion.
302
 According to the AfDB, Africa has 
the world’s highest unemployment rate, after Europe.303 Further, African 
economies do not currently create enough jobs to occupy the number of youth 
entering the job market each year.
304
 The problem of African underemployment 
has the potential to significantly worsen given Africa’s rapidly growing 
population. As at mid-2014 the population of Africa was estimated to be 1.1 
billion people
305
 and this number is expected to increase to 2.3 billion people by 
2050.
306
 It is also projected that by 2020, 250 million Africans will be aged 
between 15 and 24 years of age
307
 and by 2040 Africa will have the largest 
workforce in the world.
308
 The risk of unemployment and underemployment is 
that it can endanger social cohesion and inhibit inclusive development.
309
  
Feeding into the issue of access to employment is the issue of educational 
accessibility and quality. Africa has the world’s lowest rate of school 
enrolment.
310
 Of the small number of African children and youth who are able to 
attend school, most cannot meet basic literacy and numeracy achievements.
311
 At 
the other end of the educational spectrum, the AfDB notes that, for the period 
1999 to 2009, while the number of university graduates in sub-Saharan Africa 
tripled to 4.9 million, so too did the number of educated unemployed youth. In the 
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AfDB’s view, this occurs as a result of a disconnection between the skills learned 
at university and the skills that are required by the labour market.
312
 The lack of 
educational opportunities and suitable educational training will severely 
undermine Africa’s capability to sustain economic growth, to increase 
competitiveness or to diversify its economy into higher value added areas of 
production.
313
 The AfDB sees these events as having the potential to ‘deprive a 
whole generation of opportunities to develop their potential, escape poverty and 
support the continent’s trajectory toward inclusive growth and economic 
transformation.’314  
3  Unequal distribution of the benefits of the extractives industries 
The rectification of the unequal distribution of the benefits of the extractive 
industries is the conceptual basis for many African policy documents. Through 
the creation of an African driven policy framework, African countries seek to 
promote the extractive industries on the basis that increased investment into the 
industries, under the right policy and legislative controls, will have the effect of 
catalysing inclusive and sustainable growth in African countries.
315
 This view is 
promulgated in the following policy documents. 
C  Africa Mining Vision 
The opening statement of the AMV sets out the Africa Mining Vision:  
Transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation of mineral resources to 
underpin broad-based sustainable growth and socio-economic 
development.
316
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The AMV seeks to benefit all levels of local, regional and national African 
society through the promotion of seven of broad factors.
317
 The first factor is the 
creation of a single African market. According to the AMV, the creation of 
certain conditions will contribute to this. Firstly, it will be necessary to foster 
economic linkages. Other linkages specified in the AMV include downstream 
linkages (mineral beneficiation and manufacturing); upstream linkages (capital 
goods, consumables and services industries) and sidestream linkages 
(infrastructure, skills and technology). In addition, the creation of a single market 
will be aided by the creation of ‘mutually beneficial partnerships’ between 
African governments, the private sector, civil society and local communities. 
Finally, the AMV advocates for a ‘comprehensive knowledge of [African 
countries’] mineral endowment.’318  
The AMV lists a further six factors that are critical to creating the mining vision. 
The first of these factors is the creation of a sustainable and well-governed mining 
sector that effectively collects and uses resource rents.
319
 Secondly is the creation 
of a diversified African economy in which the mining sector is the ‘key 
component.’320 The third factor sees the mining industry helping to establish 
African infrastructure by promoting local and regional linkages.
321
 The fourth 
factor is the diversification of the mineral industry into ‘high value metals’ and 
‘low value industrial metals.’322 The fifth factor is integrating small scale and 
artisanal mining into the vision to create employment and support social and 
economic development.
323
 The final factor is the creation of a mining sector that 
is competitive on the local, continental and international markets.
324
 
That mining can be a catalyst to increased growth and industrialisation is not a 
new idea.
325
 In particular, the AMV refers to the failure of previous African 
mining policies noting that these had relied on overly ambitious projects that were 
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too reliant on foreign inputs.
326
 In constructing the AMV, the drafters examined 
the experience of resource development in Nordic countries.
327
 The AMV states 
that Nordic experiences of resource development emphasised the need: 
To have a shared strategic vision, deliberate and proactive government-led 
collective action, timely interventions and coordination of public, private 
and community interests at all levels.
328
 
The AMV recognises the ‘Asian boom’329 as a fresh opportunity for Africa to 
penetrate the market with its mineral resource products. However, for African 
countries to benefit from this boom appropriate strategies are required to guide 
development.
330
 Such strategies should seek to maximise the catalysing effect of 
mineral resources and promote broad based growth through the creation of 
linkages into the economy.
331
  
D  Action Plan for Implementing the AMV 
In December 2011, the drafters of the AMV created the ‘Action Plan for 
Implementing the AMV’ (‘Action Plan’). The Action Plan was adopted at the 
Second AU Conference of Ministers Responsible for Mineral Resources 
Development held at Addis Ababa. The Action Plan repeats the seven factors 
originally outlined in the AMV and frames them into the following statement: 
The AMV seeks to use Africa’s natural resources sector to transform the 
continent’s social and economic development path in order to address its 
poverty and limited development. It seeks to set Africa on an 
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industrialisation path, based on its natural capital, to enable the continent to 
take its place in the global economy.
332
 
The Action Plan then further defines the scope of the goals of the AMV into nine 
programme clusters.
333
 These clusters are: mining revenues and mineral rents 
management; geological and mining information systems; building human and 
institutional capacities; artisanal and small scale mining; mineral sector 
governance; research and development; environmental and social issues; linkages 
and diversification; and mobilising mining and infrastructure development.   
E  A Country Mining Vision Guidebook: Domesticating the Africa Mining 
 Vision  
The AMV is a high level document policy framework; it is the formulation of ‘an 
ambitious change-making process.’334 Very recently the AMDC, a body created 
as a joint initiative by the AU Commission, the AfDB and UNECA,
335
 conducted 
a ‘Book Sprint’ with a group of mainly African contributors. Over six days in 
September 2014, these contributors met to produce ‘A Country Mining Vision 
Guidebook: Domesticating the Africa Mining Vision’ (‘CMV Guidebook’). The 
purpose of the CMV Guidebook is to help African countries to domesticate the 
goals of the AMV.  
The value of the CMV Guidebook is that its authors considered the AMV and the 
Action Plan during the September 2014 meetings.
336
 The result of these meetings 
was the further organisation of these earlier high level policy documents into 
seven areas for country level development and implementation. The seven areas 
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are: fiscal regimes and revenue management; geological and mineral information 
systems; building human and institutional capacity; artisanal and small scale 
mining; mineral sector governance; linkages, investment and diversification, and, 
finally, environment and social issues.
337
  
As noted earlier, the two areas for discussion in this paper are fiscal regimes and 
the development of linkages. These two issues are centrally important to Africa’s 
goal of breaking with the enclave nature of mining. For instance, effective 
taxation collection can, amongst other goals, assist funding the development of 
Africa’s human capital strategies. In addition, the creation of development 
linkages is also critical as this will provide employment opportunities for a 
rapidly growing African population. Overall, increased taxation revenues and the 
creation of employment are two factors that can assist African countries manage 
the issue of fragility.  
1  Fiscal linkages 
According to the AMV, a ‘principal resource endowment opportunit[y]’ is the 
collection of resource rents.
338
 Resource rents are critical as they can be used to 
‘improve the basic physical and knowledge infrastructure of the nation through 
investment in physical infrastructure and social and human infrastructure.’339 The 
AMV reports that one of the constraints on the collection of resource rents by 
African governments is weak governance and institutions.
340
 The effect of 
countries with weak governance and institutions is that they tend to fail to 
establish appropriate resource tax regimes to ensure an equitable return to the 
country for the extraction of their mineral resources.
341
 The AMV reports that 
African countries previously sought to capture resource rents through state mining 
enterprises.
342
 However, many African countries now perceive that attracting 
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investment is not the problem and that the maximisation of the benefits of 
investment can be achieved through regulative, policy and fiscal regimes.
343
  
In order to create appropriate taxation regimes, the Action Plan states that ‘[a] key 
challenge in the design of fiscal frameworks for the mining sector is the often 
conflicting objectives of mining companies and governments.’344 The Action Plan 
notes that mining companies seek maximisation of the net present value of their 
investment whereas governments seek to maximise the return from the investment 
to fund social and economic infrastructure.
345
 According to the Action Plan, 
mining projects in Africa have been characterised by ‘assurances that there would 
be no additions to the total tax package agreed to initially.’346 These tax packages 
were often constructed through ‘overly generous tax holidays and poorly designed 
royalties and additional profit taxes.’347 The effect of these arrangements is that 
when mineral prices boomed, African governments did not receive increased 
revenues.  
The CMV Guidebook states that as mineral resources are finite and will be 
depleted by extraction, the only way that extractive industries can be sustainable 
is through the creation of fiscal and economic linkages.
348
 The CMV Guidebook 
further considers the question of appropriate revenue capture. 
349
 In its ‘Problem 
Statement’ on this issue, the CMV Guidebook states that ‘the objectives of 
government (as resource owner on behalf of citizens) needs to be balanced against 
those of investors (as providers of risk capital and technology of extraction).’350 
The CMV Guidebook suggests a number of questions that the governments of 
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African countries with mineral industries should ask themselves when seeking to 
create an appropriate fiscal regime.
351
 Such questions include:  
Does the fiscal regime deliver value for the country over the long term? 
352
 
Does the fiscal regime ensure that government receives a rising share of the 
revenues with rising profitability of mining activities? 
353
 
Does the fiscal regime inspire confidence that the country is collecting what 
is due or owed and what is fair?
 354
 
2  The Development of Linkages 
The AMV states that the development of domestic linkages is central to breaking 
the enclave nature of resource development in Africa.
355
 Like resources rents, 
upstream and downstream linkages have been identified in the AMV as ‘principal 
resource endowment opportunities.’356 According to the AMV, African countries 
have been unsuccessful in creating downstream value addition due to a lack of 
critical inputs, such as energy, high entry barriers for the creation of beneficiation 
processes and the ‘global corporate beneficiation strategies of TNCs, who often 
prefer to send crude resources to a central beneficiation facility in another 
country.’357 In addition, the AMV states that there has been a governance failure 
to impose and enforce minimum levels of beneficiation upon those mining 
companies operating in African countries.
358
  The AMV attributes the failure of 
African countries to create upstream value addition to three factors. The first 
factor is the ‘centralised purchasing strategies of most resource extraction TNCs.’ 
The second factor is the inability of a limited domestic business sector to compete 
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for upstream value addition business opportunities. The final factor is the lack of 
human resources and technical capacity.
359
   
The CMV Guidebook discusses ‘Linkages, Investments and Diversification.’360 
The CMV restates the AMV goal for linkages and diversification thusly:  
To create a mining sector that catalyses and contributes to broad-based 
growth through upstream, downstream, sidestream and infrastructure 
linkages.
361
 
The CMV Guidebook explains the various types of direct linkages. Upstream (or 
backward) linkages are the first linkages to appear at the commencement of a 
mining project. Such linkages are the ‘direct or indirect inter-firm relationships 
connecting an industry with its suppliers or supply chain.’362 The ISG Report 
provides examples of upstream linkages; for instance, suppliers who identify 
deposits; suppliers of labour, equipment and utilities; suppliers of machinery, 
equipment and vehicles, and mining services.
363
 Downstream (or forward) 
linkages ‘reflect the interconnectedness of a specific sector to other sectors in the 
economy that consume its output.’364 Examples of downstream linkages include 
mineral processing, smelting and refining, semi-fabrication and product 
manufacture.
365
 The CMV Guidebook notes the value of the mineral (by weight) 
increases at each stage of the downstream processes. Different minerals will have 
different mineral value chains.
366
 For instance, the value of a diamond at 
extraction can be increased by a factor of 5000 through the beneficiation 
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process.
367
 Finally, the CMV Guidebook discusses the creation of industries 
alongside the mining industry (sidestream linkages), for instance, stock markets, 
financial services, utilities, logistics, communications, technology development 
and innovation.
368
   
The CMV Guidebook asserts that these linkages between the minerals industries 
and the African economy are weak. Exemplifying these weak links, the CMV 
Guidebook notes that African minerals are generally exported in their raw form 
and that mining related inputs are commonly imported.
369 
The CMV Guidebook 
emphasises the importance of creating linkages to enable African countries to 
transition from a primary commodity exporter to ‘a high-technology, knowledge-
intensive economy.’370  
According to the CMV Guidebook, the factors that constrain Africa’s ability to 
build these linkages are varied. Firstly, it states that most African countries lack 
appropriate policies and strategies to foster industrialisation, value addition and 
beneficiation.
371
 Then, when policies do exist, they are not strengthened by 
legislative enforcement. In addition targets, timelines and indicators for value 
addition and beneficiation are unclear and there is ineffective (or no) monitoring 
of progress against targets.
372
 Again, as in the discussion for fiscal regimes, the 
CMV Guidebook poses a number of questions for African governments to 
consider in domesticating the AMV. One such question is: 
What are the national policies and strategies and enforcement mechanisms 
for the promotion of industrialisation, beneficiation and value addition?
373
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(a) Conclusions 
In addition to the dominant narratives of the resource curse and Dutch disease, an 
additional narrative has constrained earlier attempts by African governments to 
create and implement development strategies. As stated by the Congolese 
Ambassador to the United Nations in 1960, the actions of African countries have 
historically been framed within the context social, economic and ‘congenital 
intellectual underdevelopment.’ In light of Mr Barnett’s attempts to position WA 
as a helpful adviser to African governments seeking to promote their mineral 
industries, all such preconceptions must be avoided. The documents discussed in 
this chapter represent the ongoing formulation of a coherent and cohesive policy 
framework for the development of Africa’s mineral industries. Further, and 
importantly, they also represent a break away from the more limited WBG 
interventions. Being aware of these policy documents and familiar with their 
content is undoubtedly beneficial for companies seeking to do business in African 
countries’ extractive industries.   
VIII  WESTERN AUSTRALIAN DEVELOPMENT IDEOLOGY 
In light of Mr Barnett’s offer to ‘moral and political support’374 to African 
countries seeking to develop their mining industries and the COMESA MOU 
signed in January 2014, an examination of the history of mineral resource 
development in WA may be instructive. In examining the development ideology 
underpinning the mining industry in WA, two main texts will be considered. In 
1981, the University of Western Australia Press published ‘State, Capital and 
Resources in the North and West of Australia’ (‘1981 text’). The 1981 text is a 
collection of academic and ministerial papers collected and published in response 
to the absence of informed debate surrounding resource development in Western 
Australia.
375
  In 2014, Springer Publishing published ‘Resource Curse or Cure?: 
On the Sustainability of Development in Western Australia’ (‘2014 text’). The 
2014 text is a collection of academic articles published to stimulate ‘much-needed 
                                                          
374
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public debate’ regarding the ‘expectation that minerals and fossil fuels are 
infinitely available and their development universally beneficial.’376 What will 
become apparent through the analysis of these two texts is that the problems of 
WA’s resource development strategies, as anticipated in 1981, have arguably not 
been addressed. 
WA’s mining industry is often heralded as a great success and the idea that the 
State’s legislative and investment regime should be emulated by other countries 
seeking to promote their own mineral resources industries is not new. In the early 
1980s, the Honourable Peter Vernon Jones, Minister for Resources Development; 
Mines, Fuel and Energy; Industrial Development and Commerce
377
 advocated 
that WA’s mining policies would be a ‘model for developing, resource-rich 
countries.’378 However it has also been argued that WA is a ‘resource cursed’ 
economy; with academics pointing to ‘islands of disadvantage … in resource rich 
locations.’379 To assert that WA suffers with the resource curse conflicts, almost 
heretically, with the dominant narrative of resource development that has 
developed in the state. 
A  The Dominant Narrative for Mining in Western Australia 
The dominant narrative for Western Australia’s mining industry is explored in the 
opening chapter of the 2014 text.
380
 The first chapter, written by the editors of the 
book, discusses the widely publicised economic success of WA’s mining 
industry, which has been particularly exalted in the aftermath of the global 
                                                          
376
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financial crisis.
381
 The editors refer to the 2013 ‘State of the States Report’ which 
ranked WA as Australia’s best performing economy.382 In 2010-2011, the 
resources sector generated $4.9 billion in royalty payments, driven by iron ore 
operations and petroleum.
383
 In addition, commodity exports contributed ‘around 
29% to overall production in WA and represented 95% of all merchandise 
exports.’384 This represented a significant increase in commodity exports for the 
period since 2004, such increase being driven by strong Chinese demand.
385
 
However, even as commodity prices have dropped and the economy has slowed, 
it has been projected that the State’s mining industry will increase its contribution 
to WA’s economy.386  
The resources boom has also had an impact on employment patterns. It is reported 
that workers have transitioned out of other employment into the State’s mining 
industry; approximately ‘10% … of the State’s 1.2 million-strong workforce’ is 
employed by the resources industry.
387
 In addition mine workers have received 
significant earnings increases making ‘five of the State’s mining towns … among 
the nation’s richest top ten postcodes.’388 Males working in mining have 
particularly benefitted from earnings growth.
389
 In addition, it is reported that as 
mining intensity has increased in WA, mining businesses have shifted offices to 
new quarters in the state’s capital of Perth.390 
However, there have also been other impacts for the State as a result of the 
resources boom. For instance, while WA has the highest average incomes, it also 
has the most uneven income spread (using the Gini coefficient) of any Australian 
state.
391
 In addition, the cost of living is estimated to have increased by $132 per 
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week during 2006 and 2008.
392
 As a result of increased migration into the state, 
the housing market became more expensive: rental prices increased by 11.9% to 
$470 per week in the twelve month period to April 2013.
393
 This is a significant 
concern given that in 2013 the minimum weekly wage in WA was only $628. By 
April 2013, Perth’s median house price had reached a record price of $510,000.394 
The impact on housing prices in the state’s remote regions has been even greater, 
as median house prices in mining towns have reached $790,000 and median rental 
costs have increased to $1,500 per week.
395
 The increased cost of housing has a 
significant impact on low income earners who must access social service 
assistance to meet basic living costs.
396
  
1  Shaping the Dominant Narrative through Institutional Capture 
Elizabeth Harman’s article in the 1981 text contended that the staged theory of 
development underpinned the ideology of development in WA.
397
 Harman stated 
that this theory of development has three stages. The initial stage is the extraction 
and exportation of raw materials.
398
 The second stage, value addition or 
beneficiation, will (inevitably, according to Sir Charles Court) occur because the 
costs of transportation of raw materials will ‘force buyers to purchase a more 
refined commodity so that they may avoid shipping waste.’399 The third stage 
would see Western Australia make the transition from a quarry to a financier in 
the world economy.
400
  
It has been argued that shifts in the State’s economy outlined in the previous 
section have been assisted by the institutional capture of the State’s apparatus by 
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large mining companies.
401
 In WA, one feature of this institutional capture is the 
development of a narrative of resources developing whereby the impact of the 
State in developing its own mineral industry has been minimised. This is critical 
in the extractives industries because the mineral resource itself is absolutely 
bound to its location in a way that many other products are not.
402
  
Harman’s 1981 article discussed the threat of institutional capture. In particular, 
Harman’s article discussed the ideology of mineral development in WA during 
the period 1960 to 1980.
403
 Harman asserted that the State’s policy originally 
designated mineral development as a ‘job creator’404 and that it was thought that 
the collection of resource rents (through royalties) would dampen job creation. As 
a result of this policy, Harman argued that Western Australia was ‘auctioning off 
resources at bargain prices’405 in the hope of inviting investment and creating 
jobs. Over time, efficient development became the State’s primary goal. 
Intriguingly, Sir Charles Court boasted of asking companies ‘not how many men 
can you employ but how few?’406  Accordingly, the contribution of labour to 
wealth creation was minimised. As part of this process, labour was labelled as 
disruptive
407
 as the result of seeking unreasonable wage demands.
408
 Having 
disenfranchised the local workforce, the State then courted multinational 
corporations on the basis that only multinationals had the financial, technological 
and trade skills to undertake large scale projects
409
 to drive the State’s growth. 
Ultimately, a duel economy is created whereby local companies were effectively 
marginalised by ‘the effects of unequal competition for labour, capital, or state 
support’410 and by the restriction of their ability to participate in large projects 
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other than on the contractual terms granted to them by multinational 
companies.
411
 This duel economy is evidenced by the separate publications issued 
by The Department of Industrial Development: ‘Enterprise’ covered agriculture, 
small scale manufacturing and ‘local ingenuity’ and ‘Prospect’ discussed the 
mining, energy and export trade.
412
  
WA, unlike other resource rich countries, eschewed state equity
413
 preferring a 
free market ideology.
414
 Similarly to the ideology espoused by the WBG, the 
government saw its role as ‘limited to creating a climate conducive to 
investment.’415 In fact, the State sought to encourage ‘the entrepreneur – the man 
with spirit and vision – to get on with the job.’416 Accordingly, profits were 
distributed on the basis of risk.
417
 Any argument that a part of the profit should be 
returned to the public on the basis of ownership of the resource was dismissed as 
unjust.
418
 On this issue, Sir Charles Court stated: 
The super tax is totally unacceptable when those who have taken the 
enormous risk of making discoveries are drained out later when they strike 
it rich.
419
 
When faced with questions or criticism over the State’s development ideologies, 
Sir Charles Court’s response was to dismiss this criticism on the basis that the 
community did not understand how ‘development filters through the economy.’420 
Harman suggested that the story of WA mining became a philosophy to explain 
the State’s development that reconceptualised the realities of the State’s progress. 
For instance, the lack of direct employment associated with foreign development 
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of the State’s mineral resources421 could be overcome be professing the benefits 
of the creation of ‘indirect jobs via linkages and multiplier effects.’422  
Over time, efficient development became an ideology to explain and contain the 
development of WA’s society.423 Harman asserted that in facilitating the 
centrality of this ideology, the Mining Act 1904 and the Mining Act 1978 has 
‘primacy over all other statutes.’424 On this point, Michael Hunt writes that 
Western Australia’s Mining Act 1904 was premised on the idea that ‘land should 
be utilised for the purpose for which it is most valuable [and] that no person 
should hold any mineral rights without being required to development them.’425 
As part of a philosophy of land use that prioritises mining, private land rights 
were able to be challenged by mining developers;
426
 environmentalism was 
labelled as ‘superstition’427 and ‘socially irresponsible’428 and land claims by 
indigenous Australians were labelled ‘apartheid.’429  
2  Loss of control of the investment decision 
Given the State’s adherence to the staged theory of development and the reliance 
upon multinationals to provide the financial, technological and trade skills to 
undertake large scale projects, it is important to consider how these factors 
impacted development in WA. E J Crough and E L Wheelwright, in their 
contribution to the 1981 text, noted that ‘[T]he transnational corporation has 
internationalised the means of production, and hence centralised economic power 
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on a world scale.’430 The authors stated that the result of this centralised economic 
power was the weakening of the State’s ability to control its own economic 
destiny.
431
 On this point, it was asserted that ‘the more a country is penetrated by 
transnationals, the more deeply is its economy and society affected.’432 By the late 
1970s Australia was the second most penetrated OECD country. Crough and 
Wheelwright posit that countries that are deeply penetrated by transnational 
corporations experience ‘growth and development … which suits the 
requirements of the corporations.’433 According to Crough and Wheelwright, 
during the 1960s, the Australian mineral industries developed in such a way that 
they became more aligned with the global economy than with the Australian 
economy.
434
 Four factors indicated this global alignment. The first factor was the 
high level of foreign ownership and control.
435
 The second factor was the large 
inflows and outflows of foreign capital.
436
 The third factor was the 
‘overwhelmingly export-orientated’ nature of the mineral resource industry (for 
example, in 1979-1980 minerals exports accounted for 70% of total mineral 
production).
437
 The fourth factor was a heavy reliance on imported equipment, 
which ‘limit[ed] the possibilities of the development of both upstream and 
downstream industries.’438   
According to Crough and Wheelwright, the factors set out in the preceding 
chapter can result in the State suffering a loss of control over investment 
decisions.
439
 They state that this loss of control will result in the host country’s 
economy and society becoming shaped by the investment decisions of the 
transnational companies. The business decisions of these transnational companies 
effect the ‘location of production, the types of products produced, the sort of 
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technology used, and the types and amount of labour necessary’440 Regarding the 
issue of the creation of linkages, Crough and Wheelwright noted that although 
mineral extraction is determined by the location of the mineral resource, 
transnationals still exerted control over the location of processing facilities.
441
  
3  Resource Development Policies in Western Australia – A 1981 Ministerial 
 Statement 
The Honourable Peter Vernon Jones adds a Ministerial statement to the 1981 text 
titled ‘Resource Development Policies in Western Australia.’442 His Ministerial 
statement commenced with the assertion that: ‘[T]he State government of 
Western Australia has as its overall objective, an increase in the standard of living 
and economic security of the community.’443 In line with the view espoused by 
Sir Charles Court, Jones also adds, ‘[A] substantial part of our development can 
be attributed to the beneficial influence of international companies.’444  
According to Mr Jones, the role of the state government was to promote ‘the 
further development and production of raw minerals.’ 445 In line with this 
statement, value adding and beneficiation would occur ‘in partnership with 
overseas consumers’ and ‘where such processing would be of benefit to Western 
Australia and the consuming country.’ 446 On the question of broader state 
development, Mr Jones clarified that while a diversified economy was a desirable 
goal, the State would need to continue to rely on the mineral resources industries 
until diversification could be achieved.
447
 Accordingly, the State should act to 
retain ‘the confidence of investors’448 as it would not be possible for WA to 
continue to grow without their trust.
449
 Maintaining the trust of investors and the 
credibility of the State was based on not changing the ‘rules of the game’ by 
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‘capricious’ government decisions.450 Further elaboration on this point was not 
provided by the Ministerial Statement.  
Mr Jones continued his statement by asserting that the development of the State’s 
mining industry ‘is not a one-sided affair. There are benefits for both the state and 
the private developer.’451 To this end, the State sought the ‘maximum economic 
flow-on from development projects.’452 According to Mr Jones, the maximum 
economic benefit from mineral resource development was not simply the payment 
of money to the State by project proponents but the use of ‘local manufacturing 
capacity to its greatest possible extent.’453 Therefore, local manufacturers would 
have a ‘genuine opportunity’ to participate in the competitive bidding process and 
to be appointed, if the bid was competitive.
454
 In the vein of earlier statements by 
Sir Charles Court, Mr Jones noted that beneficiation added value to the raw 
material and increased employment opportunities and business opportunities
455
 
because it ‘widen[ed] the range of marketing options available.’456 However, Mr 
Jones reiterated that any benefit to the State from beneficiation must be weighed 
up against the benefits to the importing country of the value added material.
 457
  
4  The position in 2014 – the continued loss of control over investment 
 decisions and the dream of value addition 
Al Rainnie, Scott Fitzgerald and Bradon Ellem, in their combined contribution to 
the 2014 text, assert that the ideology and factors underlying resource 
development in WA has changed little in the intervening years since the 1981 
text.
458
 Building on Crough and Wheelwright’s discussion of the State’s loss of 
control over investment decisions, the degree of ‘institutional capture’ apparent in 
Western Australia is further developed.
459
 The authors firstly state that the mining 
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boom of the 1960s ‘tied the state into global and financial networks’460 and, 
further that, by the end of the 1990s, the State ‘had lost any real control’ in its 
dealings with the world’s largest mining corporations or with the influx of smaller 
companies into WA.
461
  
(a) Loss of control of the investment decision and value addition 
An illustration of the loss of control over the investment decision as originally 
expressed by Crough and Wheelwright is represented by ‘the dream of value 
adding.’462 Mr Barnett in a speech titled ‘Energy Resources Down Under: Right 
Place, Right Time’ and given in April 2010 to the James A. Baker III Institute for 
Public Policy at Rice University, Texas, stated that beneficiation is the most 
‘debated obligation’ in the older State Agreements made between the WA and 
project proponents.
463
 Mr Barnett explained that State Agreements for mining 
projects (which are agreements between the State and project proponents that are 
ratified by Parliament) are designed: 
to facilitate project development but do not extend to equity participation. 
While the government does have a say, the industry remains a truly private 
enterprise industry.
464
  
Notwithstanding the inclusion of obligations of value addition in State 
Agreements, Mr Barnett noted that ‘further processing obligations … have not 
worked.’465 An illustration of the State’s inability to enforce the value added 
obligations contained in its State Agreements is demonstrated in the Second 
Reading Speech for the Iron Ore Processing (Mineralogy Pty Ltd) Agreement 
Amendment Bill 2008.
466
 The originating State Agreement, ratified by the Iron 
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Ore Processing (Mineralogy Pty Ltd) Agreement Act 2002,
467
 contained a 
‘surprising’ level of beneficiation that was now being sought to be reduced468 by 
the ratification of a variation agreement made on 14 November 2008 between the 
parties. During the Second Reading Speech, Mark McGowan, the current leader 
for the Labor Party (and the party in government at the time the original State 
Agreement was made) made the point that the global economic situation had 
changed since the original State Agreement was made.
469
 While Japan had 
previously been a major trading partner of the State; its place had been superseded 
by China. The implication being that the State’s mineral extraction and value 
adding capabilities should be adjusted to infiltrate this new market. Firstly, it may 
be argued that, in the context of very little investment into the State during the 
late 1990s,
470
 the State has entered into and ratified a State Agreement that 
contained unrealistic promises of value addition. Secondly, that in making 
mineral resource development central to the State’s development, WA’s ability to 
enforce the obligations contained in State Agreements is weakened by having to 
respond, first and foremost, to global market considerations rather than by an 
assessment of what is most beneficial for the State. 
(b) The end of the resources boom 
The final chapter of the 2014 text, co-written by the editors of the book, contends 
that WA has ‘little to show’ for the recent resources boom.471 They refer to Paul 
Cleary’s warning, issued in 2011, that the government must ensure that mining 
leaves more ‘than just a big hole – both physically and economically.’472 WA, 
despite being at the ‘epicentre of the country’s resource boom’ now faces a 
budget deficit due to a reduction in the collection of royalties.
473
 In addition, as a 
result of failing to control government spending, the State has lost its Standard & 
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Poor’s AAA Credit Rating.474 The Western Australian government has responded 
to these budget pressures and downgraded credit rating by introducing budgetary 
measures such as increasing land taxes, restricting access to the stamp duty 
concession provided to first home buyers, abolishing the $36 private motor 
vehicle registration fee concession and increasing the cost of parking.
475
  
In the 2012-2013 State Budget, the WA Government announced a Mineral 
Royalty Rate Analysis.
476
 The purpose of the analysis is to determine the 
‘ongoing efficiency and appropriateness’ of the State’s royalty policy.477 The last 
review of the State’s royalty policy was conducted in 1981.478 The State sought 
submissions which have been compiled into a summary.
479
 Submissions sought to 
emphasise the destabilising impact of a change to royalty rates on the State by 
asserting that ‘increasing the royalty rate would increase uncertainty and 
discourage future investment.’480 In addition, submissions were made that ‘now is 
not the right time’ to change the State’s royalty regime because of the ‘tough 
economic circumstances’ for the mining industry.481 In particular, the Chamber of 
Minerals and Energy of WA pointed to the ‘decreased grades and increased 
stripping ratios … and more complex geotechnical conditions’ that WA mining 
projects currently operate in.
482
 It is arguable that the State has missed earlier 
opportunities to maximise mining revenues when mining conditions were more 
favourable to mining companies.   
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5  Sovereign Risk and Resource Nationalism 
In light of the State’s Mineral Royalty Rate Analysis, submissions suggested that 
a change to the State’s royalty rates would increase perceptions of sovereign risk. 
Sovereign risk is defined in similar terms as resource nationalism. It is the risk 
‘that arises as a result of actions by a foreign government, which may affect the 
management of a foreign business’.483 Resource nationalism is characterised as 
‘acts by host states to expropriate or change the terms on which resources are 
extracted, and monetised, in order to obtain greater benefits for the host state.’484  
As noted above, WA’s development ideology is firmly ensconced in the concept 
of providing an environment conducive to encouraging foreign investment. It is 
arguable that, for this reason, the State has become limited in its available fiscal 
policy responses when confronted with budget pressures. In addition, the fact that 
WA’s mining industry has reached maturity arguably means that the State’s 
ability to take a strong position in its dealings with mining companies is lessened. 
However, the accuracy of this statement will be tested by the WA government’s 
decisions on royalty rates following the Mineral Royalty Rate Analysis. It is 
likely that, notwithstanding that the last review of the royalty policy for the State 
occurred over 30 years ago,
485
 a critical factor for the State to manage will be to 
avoid being accused by the mining industry of capriciously changing the rules of 
the game.   
                                                          
483
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IX  ANALYSIS 
A  The Promotion of Strategies for Investments in Minerals and Petroleum 
and the Development of Linkages (COMESA MOU) 
One of the areas of cooperation established in the MOU includes the promotion of 
strategies for investment in minerals and petroleum and the development of 
linkages for COMESA Member States.
486
 WA and African countries have 
traversed very different paths of mineral and state development. However, it is 
arguable that both paths have been subverted by the requirements of global 
business demands. While WA has been a more willing participant in this process, 
African countries have instead been subjected to ‘the most intense and recurrent’ 
WBG interventions of the late 20
th
 Century.
487
 As African countries have 
transitioned from being an object of investment to an agent seeking investment, 
one central theme has emerged in its policy documents. The central goal of 
African mining policy is the utilization of the mining industries to catalyse broad-
based sustainable growth and socio-economic development.
488
 There are many 
reasons for African countries to pursue this transformative agenda, however this 
paper focused on the need for African countries to address the effects of fragility: 
‘a condition of elevated risk of institutional breakdown, societal collapse, or 
violent conflict.’489   
It is arguable that following WA’s development strategies would be of limited 
utility to African countries. As noted by the drafters of the AMV when 
considering the Nordic experience of mineral development, African countries face 
‘a very different historical and socio-economic environment.’490 Equally such a 
statement applies to the WA experience of resource development. While the 
CMV Guidebook specifically points to the limitations of the exploitation of 
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487
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Africa’s non-renewable resources, it is arguable that the ideologies that have 
underpinned WA’s extractive industries have been premised on the belief that 
minerals and fossil fuels are infinitely available.  
B  Development Ideologies 
According to the AMV, African countries are conscious of the risks associated 
with over reliance on extractive industries.
491
 Consequently, while seeking to 
promote mining in Africa, the AMV also advocates that African governments 
should seek to create mining regimes that manage revenue volatility. In addition, 
the AMV advocates that African countries should seek to reduce their dependence 
on mineral resources and diversify their economies. Finally, African countries 
should seek to develop internal markets for mineral products that will hedge 
against the volatility of external markets.
492
 
The experience of resources development in WA is not easily aligned with these 
goals. Returning to the staged theory of development explained in Harman’s 
article in the 1981 text,
493
 it is apparent that WA’s development has been shaped 
and constrained by the needs of large foreign investors. Given the ‘dream of value 
addition’ as expressed by Mr Barnett, it is arguable that the State has been 
constrained from proceeding from the initial stage of development (the extraction 
and exportation of raw materials).  
In addition, the impact of institutional capture on WA’s development narrative is 
exemplified by the speech made by Mr Barnett in April 2010 to the James A. 
Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, Texas. During this speech, 
Mr Barnett states ‘Western Australia might claim to be the world’s leading 
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mining economy’494 but he is at pains to point out that this status could not have 
been achieved without overseas investment.
495
 
It is arguable that WA’s resource development ideologies, given that they appear 
to have changed little in the last 30 years, will be unresponsive to Africa’s goals 
of inclusive and sustainable growth and the creation of diversified economies. 
Further, an argument may be made that seeking to embed WA’s mining 
philosophies into African countries does not represent a transition from the initial 
stage of development of mineral extraction and exportation. In addition, in 
assisting African governments to promote and regulate their mining industries, the 
WA government may find that its advice is viewed by African governments as a 
method by which to commit African countries to a constrained development 
environment. 
C  Fiscal Regimes 
Another example of the dissonance between WA and African countries is the 
issue of fiscal regimes. It is apparent from the CMV Guidebook that the preferred 
method of revenue collection is one that ensures that the governments receive a 
rising share of the revenues as mining profitability increases.
496
 This result could 
be achieved through a rent based tax or by a profit based royalty.
497
 Historically, 
WA has been particularly adverse to a profit tax; noting Sir Charles Court’s 
assertion that such a tax would ‘drain’ the profits of the risk taking entrepreneurs. 
In more recent times, when the Minerals Resource Rent Tax 2012 (now repealed) 
the State’s ire was reignited. It has been reported that Mr Barnett labelled the tax 
as ‘flawed’ and would result in ‘perverse outcomes.’498  
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WA collects revenues through the application of royalties and this charge is a 
purchase price ‘to compensate the community for the loss of its assets’499 and is 
therefore not responsive to mining profitability.
500
 However, this form of royalty 
collection is not the most economically efficient or equitable system.
501
 An 
alternative is a profit based royalty. This type of royalty is based on the net 
income or profit of a project.
502
 This type of profit is more economically efficient 
and equitable, although the risk is that royalties may not be collected for a number 
of years while capital costs are recovered by project proponents.
503
 A profit-based 
royalty is not applied in WA, likely because any State revenue collection 
legislation must not leave WA vulnerable to the Commonwealth’s taxation 
powers,
504
 given that Commonwealth taxation legislation overrides any 
inconsistent State legislation.
505
 
D  Linkages 
Another goal for inclusive and sustainable development in African countries is the 
creation of linkages. The CMV Guidebook states: 
The only countries which have industrialised from their use of mineral 
resources are those that have utilised these seminal linkages.
506
 
Again, on this issue, it is arguable that the WA experience of beneficiation may 
be of little instructive value to African countries. As noted by Mr Barnett, the 
dream of value adding has not transpired in WA. This is due to a number of 
factors. Firstly, it is arguable that the State has allowed its role in the development 
of the State to be shaped by the needs of foreign investors in its attempts to 
                                                          
499
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provide an attractive investment climate. As noted in the 1981 text, when it 
became apparent that little direct employment would flow from investment into 
the WA’s mining industry, the response was to emphasise the benefit of indirect 
employment opportunities that would flow from industries associated with 
mining. However, given the State’s loss of investment control due to the 
penetration into the State of transnational corporations, the State has not been able 
to fully realise these potential employment benefits. Secondly, it can also be 
stated that WA governments have been unable to enforce beneficiation 
obligations contained in State Agreements as a result of having to respond to the 
changing needs of international markets.  
X  CONCLUSION 
It has been stated that ‘[e]very serious clash between amenity and development 
involves the law.’507 Noting that the primary aim of the MOU is to ‘tap into WA’s 
expertise to help African nations to further develop their mining laws’508 an 
assessment of the ideologies and policies that have underpinned the development 
of WA’s mining laws and Africa’s policy statements for its mineral industries has 
been undertaken. To understand the content of the Africa Mining Vision, it is 
necessary to examine the earlier interventions into Africa. Through these 
experiences, African governments have come to view the proper exploitation of 
their mineral industries within certain ideological frameworks. Overall, African 
countries seek to utilise their mineral resources to catalyse inclusive and 
sustainable growth.  
African governments have sought to move away from external interventions and, 
instead, to become the authors of their own extractive industries policies and 
legislation. As part of this process, African governments and bodies (such as 
COMESA) have been examining the experience of resource development in other 
                                                          
507
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resource rich countries. However, for the reasons examined above, it is contended 
that the ideologies and experiences of WA’s mineral industry are not aligned with 
the goals contained in the AMV. The dissonance between the experience of 
resource development between WA and African countries is not insurmountable 
to fostering beneficial relationships at a governmental and business level. 
However, to foster these relationships it is important that the WA government and 
companies, who do business in Africa, become familiar with what African 
countries want from the development of their mineral resource industries. To this 
end, African development bodies have produced a number of policy documents 
that very express the goals for mineral industries development in African 
countries. 
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